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NOTICE
The Media at the Tip of the Spear
Kevin A. Smith

EMBEDDED: THE MEDIA AT WAR IN IRAQ. By Bill Katovsky1 and
Timothy Carlson.2 Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press. 2003. Pp.
xix, 422. $23.95.
Due largely to the first widespread availability of the telegraph,
through which breaking stories could be transmitted to the presses in
moments, the debut of the American war correspondent occurred
during the Civil War.3 From their beginning, American war
correspondents have frequently "embedded" with the troops on whom
they reported.4 General Grant, for example, allowed his favorite New
York Herald reporter to travel with his entourage, and even used him
as a personal messenger.5
Reporters proved an important component of the war effort for
both the North and the South. Papers on both sides proved willing
providers of propaganda to rally citizen support.6 Southern papers
exaggerated Northern casualties, refused to acknowledge Confederate
defeats, and characterized Union troops as drunken foreigners.7
Northern papers ignored Union difficulties in drafting troops and
racism in the Union Army, and downplayed Union defeats.8
But from the beginning, the war correspondents' value to both
society and the military has been questioned. Civil War-era dispatches
were frequently inaccurate, biased, and sensationalist, "a series of wild
ravings about the roaring of the guns and the whizzing of the shells
and the superhuman valour of the men."9 Just as today, not every
officer appreciated journalists' efforts. General Sherman wrote, "Now
1. Former researcher at the Brookings Institute.
2. FORMER staff writer for the Los Angeles Herald Examiner.
3. See PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY 1 9-20 (rev. ed., Prion Books Ltd.
2000) (1975).
4. Id. at 28.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 24-26.
7. Id. at 25-26, 29-30.
8. Id. at 21, 30-31 .
9. Id. at 2 1 (quoting Edwin Godkin, STRAND MAGAZINE, Vol. 4 at 571).
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to every army and almost every general a newspaper reporter goes
along . . . inciting jealousy and discontent, and doing infinite
mischief."10 The desire to suppress that mischief produced early,
haphazard efforts to censor dispatches harmful to the military effort.11
Nevertheless, their reports proved profitable to newspapers,
multiplying circulation when a large battle was featured.12
The Civil War established the framework that would characterize
the media-military relationship to the present day. The two
institutions have always shared a tense but symbiotic relationship.
During times of war, the military depends on the media to defuse
enemy propaganda, to serve as an information conduit to the people,
and to rally domestic support.13 A war that lasts more than a few days
requires the consent of the public, and that consent is not forthcoming
without at least some favorable information on the war's progress.14
Consequently, the military has sought to mold that coverage to serve
its own ends, frequently relying on prepublication review of reporters'
stories and restricting their access to the battlefield and politically
damaging information.

10. Id. at 28.
11. Id. at 27.
12 Id. at 23 (noting that during the Civil War, "a large New York newspaper could sell
five times its normal circulation when it ran details of a big battle" (emphasis omitted)); id.
at 69 (describing the First World War as "good business for newspapers"); Lawrence K.
Grossman, War and the Balance Sheet, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., May/June 2003, at 6
("The Los Angeles Times published an extra 200,000 copies a day during Desert Storm.").
But war increases the Pentagon's need for secrecy. See Douglas Porch, No Bad Stories, 55
NAVAL WAR C. REv. 85, 86 (2002) ("[T]he military, like most bureaucracies, prefers to do
its business behind closed doors - all the more so because the nature of its business is so
often shocking to the sensitivities of the public, on whose support it must rely.").
13. Seep. 206 (quoting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs Bryan Whitman:
"We looked for ways that could mitigate Saddam's lying, and of course, one of the things
that came to mind . . . was to put independent objective observers throughout the
battlefield."); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq, FOREIGN AFF.,
July/Aug. 2003, at 60, 67 ("Embedding reporters with forward military units undercut
Saddam's strategy of creating international outrage by claiming that U.S. troops were
deliberately killing civilians.").
14. Arthur Lubow, Read Some About It, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 1991, at 23, 25. The
Department of Defense acknowledged its dependence on the media in the ground rules
issued to embeds in the War in Iraq, stating:
Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the
national security environment now and in the years ahead. This holds true for the U.S.
public: the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition;
and publics in countries where we conduct operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the
cost and duration of our involvement.
P. 402 app. (citing Dep't of Def. Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media During
Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands Area of
Responsibility para. 2.A (2003), available at http://www.dod.miUnews/Feb2003/d20030228
pag.pdf (last visited Mar.1, 2004) [hereinafter "PAG"].
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The stationing of over five-hundred journalists within military
units during Operation Iraqi Freedom represents the most recent
round in this relationship and the largest expansion of the century-old
practice of embedding.15 Selected reporters lived, traveled, and slept
with the units to which they were assigned for weeks or months at a
time. They ate the same military rations, faced the same enemy fire,
and rode in the same Humvees as the troops on whom they reported.
Some were seasoned battlefield reporters, some former soldiers
themselves, and still others as green as many of the troops they were
covering.
The recent war in Iraq provided fodder for many a soldier or
journalist's post-war memoir, most of which were hastily produced to
reach the market before the public's attention turned elsewhere.
Some, such as former-marines-turned-embeds Ray Smith and Bing
West's The March Up16 documented the fighting and strategy of the
war; others, such as Todd Purdum's A Time of Our Choosing11 framed
the war in its larger political context; still others, such as Anne
Garrels's Naked in Baghdad18 painted a more intimate picture of the
fear and uncertainty of reporting from inside a city under attack; but
Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq, through its sheer breadth of
interviews, has established itself as the definitive account, not of the
fighting, but the coverage of the fighting.
Embedded is the story of several dozen j ournalists who secured
slots within military units, as well as some, whom the Pentagon
dubbed unilaterals, who chose to operate independently of the
military's embed program. Told in the form of short interviews,
Embedded provides an oral history of covering "the most covered war
in history" (pp. xi, 419). The interviewees are pro- and anti-war; pro
and anti-embedding; American, European, and Middle-Eastern; men
and women; embed and unilateral. They are photographers, radio
correspondents, television talking heads (ranging from Al-Jazeera to
Fox News), authors of magazine features, and ordinary newspaper
reporters. This variety of perspectives makes Embedded a surprisingly
useful lens through which to view the media and rnilitary's new, hand
in-glove relationship.
This Notice relies on the stories in Embedded to argue that the
embed program was a successful accommodation of the needs of the
15. P. xiv; Andrew Jacobs, My Week at Embed Boot Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003,
(Magazine), at 34, 36. The Pentagon defines an embedded reporter as "a media
representative remaining with a unit on an extended basis - perhaps a period of weeks or
even months." P. 403 (citing PAO, supra note 14).
16. RAY L. SMITH & BING WEST, THE MARCH UP: TAKING BAGHDAD WITH THE lST
MARINE DIVISION (2003).
17. TODD s. PURDUM, A TIME OF OUR CHOOSING (2003).
18. ANNE GARRELS, NAKED IN BAGHDAD (2003).
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military, the media, and the public. Whereas past military regulation
of war correspondents was plagued by practices that were only
questionably in compliance with the First Amendment, embedding
created unprecedented opportunities for battlefield reporting free
from censorship. Parts I and II provide the historic and legal
background that ultimately led to the embedding program. Part I
traces the gradual decline in media-military relations during the latter
half of the twentieth century. It is this history of progressively
increasing mutual mistrust that made the embedding process such a
surprising and interesting experiment. Part II discusses past First
Amendment challenges to military efforts to control media coverage
of war and the obstacles those plaintiffs faced in achieving judicial
review of their claims. Those challenges centered largely on access
limitations and prepublication security review of news stories.
Part III relies on the stories in Embedded to argue that embedding
made great strides towards resolving the public's need to know with
the militaries need to control information during wartime. Section A
contends that the media were able to gather frontline news stories
without censorship, and the military received comparatively favorable
coverage while maintaining mission security. Section B cautions,
however, that embedding did take its toll on reporters by calling into
question their objectivity and their ability to provide a global
perspective of the War, and by potentially compromising their First
Amendment protections. Section C argues that relaxing restraints on
unilateral reporting served as an essential component of embedding's
success. Unilaterals reported on aspects of the War outside of the
scope of the embed program, and those stories were presumptively
more objective, providing a needed counterpoint to embed reports.
I.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LATE-TWENTIETH CENTURY
MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP

Although war correspondents have been commonplace since the
Civil War, the Vietnam War marked the birth of the modern military
media relationship. It featured both the advent of televised combat
and a monumental shift in military-press interaction.19 In the early
years of the Vietnam War, the media and the military shared a
relationship of unprecedented openness.20 Access to the battlefield

19. Margaret H. Belknap,
PARAMETERS 100, 103 (2002).

The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?, 32

20. See Porch, supra note 12, at 91 ("Journalists were allowed practically unrestricted
access, accompanying units and freely filing stories, photographs, and film."); Matthew J.
Jacobs, Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of Press Restrictions in the Persian Gulf War, 44
STAN. L. REV. 675, 683 (1992) [hereinafter Jacobs Note] ("Military press restrictions in
Vietnam stand in virtual contrast to the censorship of earlier wars. In previous conflicts,
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was remarkably unrestricted, with over seven-hundred correspondents
roaming the countryside at any given time, sometimes with U.S.
troops, and sometimes hiring their own transportation, translators, and
guides.21 Unlike in previous wars, the military imposed no formal
security review or censorship.22 The United States Mission in Saigon
merely issued guidelines that requested that reporters not release
information concerning U.S. casualty figures, troop movements, and
other battle information until it was clear that the Viet Cong had
access to it.23 The guidelines were largely complied with voluntarily,
with only a very few reporters having their accreditation revoked for
violations.24
During previous conflicts, the press acted as a military booster,
loyal to the armed forces and supportive of its aims.25 During the
initial stages of Vietnam, most reporters backed the administration,
even if they were somewhat critical of its methods.26 When the war
began to tum sour, however, so did the military/press relationship.27

censorship was uneven but pervasive. During the Vietnam War, however, the Pentagon
imposed neither censorship by restricted access nor censorship by prepublication review.").
21. Pp. xi-xii; KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 387. There were, however, aspects of the
War that the press did not report or were excluded from. For example, reporters were
excluded from the operational area during the Dewey Cannon II operation for six days. Paul
Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of Access, Grenada,
and 'Off-the-Record-Wars', 73 GEO. L.J. 931, 942 (1985); James P. Terry, Press Access to
Combatant Operations in the Post-Peacekeeping Era, 154 MIL L. REV. 1, 9 n.41 (1997).
22. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 391; Terry, supra note 21, at 9.
23. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 371; Terry, supra note 21, at 9; see News Policies in
Vietnam: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 32,
154 (1966).
24. See GANNET FOUNDATION, THE MEDIA AT WAR 14-15 (1991) (reporting that only
six journalists "committed violations of the guidelines so severe, in the military's view as to
warrant revoking their credentials"); Terry, supra note 21, at 9 (reporting that "at least two"
reporters had their accreditation revoked for thirty days).
25. See p. xv ("It's an American tradition for the pen to ally itself with the sword.");
Belknap, supra note 19, at 103; Lubow, supra note 14, at 25.
26. GANNET FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 15 ("[J]ournalists who criticized the
military's performance did so out of a sense of frustration that [the] military strategy and
tactics were failing to accomplish the goal of decisively defeating the North Vietnamese
forces."); KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 348 ("What the correspondents questioned was not
American policy, but the tactics used to implement that policy . . . . "); Fred W. Friendly, TV
at the Turning Point, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Winter 1970/1971, at 13, 14 ("The
broadcast journalist went into Vietnam the same way he went into World War II and Korea
- 'as a member of the team.' (The extent of cooperation was such that the U.S. Navy's
official film on Tonkin was narrated by NBC's Chet Huntley.)").
27. See generally WILLIAM J. SMALL, To KILL A MESSENGER (1970); WILLIAM
WESTMORELAND, A SOLDIER REPORTS 420 (1976); Charles Mohr, Once Again - Did the
Press Lose Vietnam?, COLUM. JOURNALISM. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1983, at 51; Winant Sidle, A
Battle Behind the Scenes, MIL REV., Sept. 1991, at 52, 54; David H. Hackworth, Learning
How to c:;over a War: Both "Thought Control" and "No Control" Don 't Work, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 21, 1992, at 32; Drew Middleton, Barring Reporters from the Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 37.
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After the 1968 Tet Offensive, Walter Cronkite declared the war
unwinnable. The Pentagon began blaming the press for its impending
defeat, and the press, in turn, accused the Pentagon of lying about the
war.28 Phillip Knightley recounts in his history of war correspondents:
In Vietnam, the United States military had accepted war correspondents,
called on all ranks to give them full co-operation and assistance, fed them

on a reimbursable basis, briefed them, armed them when necessary,

defended them, drank with them, and, in general, treated them like
members of the team. The military was not happy with what it got in
return.29

Eventually, " [o]fficials . . . grew convinced that the reporters were on
'the other side' and blamed the press for souring the American public
on the war effort."3 0 The idea that anti-war reporters exploited the
Pentagon's generous access to publish unfavorable stories that
contributed to defeat became conventional wisdom and paved the way
for media restrictions on combat coverage during the remainder of the
century.31
The policy of unrestricted press access was drastically curtailed in
preparation for America's next conflict, Grenada, in which the
military adopted a system of press pools to manage battlefield
reporting. A press pool is a collection of reporters from various news
outlets granted special access by the military. In exchange, the work
product of any pool member becomes the property of any accredited
organization covering the war.32 The press pool system was created in
part as a response to unfavorable coverage during the Vietnam War
(p. 7 4). " [T]here was some backlash from Vietnam; the pool concept
was a way to manage the media ... . "33

28. P. xii; KN I G HTLEY, supra note 3, at 365. Belknap writes:

The media's enormous negative coverage of the Tet Offensive marked the turning point in
the Vietnam War and, as such, became the basis for heated debate as to whether the military
or the media lost the war. The disturbing images on the TV screen were in sharp contrast to
the official reports by the government and military leadership . . . . After Tet in 1968, the
reports began to be about the difference between what Washington said versus what
reporters in Vietnam saw.
Belknap, supra note 19, at 103; Porch, supra note 12, at 91.
29. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 3, at 395.
30. Lubow, supra note 14, at 25.
31. See Belknap, supra note 19, at 103; Porch, supra note 12, at 87, 91-92.
32. Malcolm W. Browne, The Military vs. the Press, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1991, § 6
(Magazine), at 27.
33. P. 74 (statement of Army Public Affairs Officer Guy Shields); see also KNIGHTLEY,
supra note 3, at 484 ("Basically the [Pentagon's) plan was to confront the media head on, to

tell journalists that unlike Vietnam, this was a war they would not be allowed to cover.");
GANNET FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 15 ("[O)fficials in the military and Reagan
administration restored a kind of de facto censorship regime, and they did so out of a sense
of dissatisfaction with the results of the voluntary approach used in Vietnam."); Belknap,
supra note 19, at 104 ("The overwhelming lesson from Vietnam seemed to have been, 'Keep
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The Press pool system failed to provide reporters with the degree
of access that Vietnam had made them accustomed to. During the first
two days of the invasion, the military refused to transport reporters to
the island, and turned away reporters' boats by firing shots across their
bows.34 Four reporters who managed to reach the island on their own
were detained and held incommunicado for two days.35 It was not until
the majority of fighting was concluded that the press was allowed on
the island, and even then, reporters could only venture out with the
escorted press pools.36 Complete, unsupervised press access did not
occur until a week after the fighting ended.37
As a result of the ensuing press outcry, the Pentagon
commissioned a panel to study the strained relationship between the
media and the military.38 Winant Sidle, the former chief of Public
Affairs for the combined U.S. Services in Vietnam was chosen as its
head.39 Media representatives urged the panel to recommend
measures that would assure significant access to future military
operations.40 The panel agreed and suggested limiting the use of press
pools to the early stages of military operations; broad access to those
pools; and military assistance to the media in the form of equipment,
military personnel, and access to communications facilities.41 At the
time, despite the unsatisfactory deployment in Grenada, press pools
seemed to be a reasonable method of accommodating the needs of
several thousand reporters simultaneously.42 Though the press

the press out!' "). President Reagan felt the media restrictions were justified because during
the Vietnam War, "the press was not on 'our side, militarily.' " Middleton, supra note 27.
34. P. xii; Belknap, supra note 19, at 104; Fred Hiatt, The Defense Department, WASH.
POST, Oct. 4, 1984, at A17.
35. Edward Cody, U.S. Forces Thwart Journalists' Reports, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1983,
at Al6; Peter Schmeisser, Shooting Pool: How the Press Lost Their Gulf War, NEW
REPUBLIC, March 18, 1991, at 21.
36. HUGH O'SHAUGHNESSY, GRENADA: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE U.S.
INVASION AND THE CARIBBEAN HISTORY THAT PROVOKED IT 205 (1984); Frank B. Cross
& Stephen M. Griffin, A Right of Press Access to United States Military Operations, 2 1
SUFFOLK U . L . REV. 989, 1004 (1987).
37. Cross & Griffin, supra note 36, at 1004-05; Marjorie Hunter, U.S. Eases Restrictions
on Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1983, at Al2.
38. GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 15-16.
39. Id. at 16; Text ofJournalists' Joint Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1984, at AlO.
40. See Text ofJournalists' Joint Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1984, at AlO.
41. Cassell, supra note 21, at 946; Terry, supra note 21, at 13.
42. See Howard B. Homonoff, Note, The First Amendment and National Security: The
Constitutionality of Press Censorship and Access Denial in Military Operations, 17 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 369, 403-04 (1985) ("In general, the Sidle Report's recommendations have
been applauded as a major step towards ensuring the greatest possible press access . . . . ");
Jacobs Note, supra note 20, at 685 ("At the time of the Sidle Report, pools seemed a
reasonable way to lessen the logistical problems of several thousand reporters attempting to
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welcomed the resulting report as a victory,43 some feared that the
recommendations were unnecessarily vague, leaving open the
possibility of case-by-case limitations on press access.44
Those fears were realized when the recommendations of the Sidle
Panel were put into practice during the invasion of Panama.45
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney delayed activating the press pool to
prevent coverage during the initial hours of the invasion.46 Even after
its late arrival, the pool was largely restricted to a local military base.47
The military in fact confined some reporters already in Panama to a
warehouse during the early fighting (p. xii). By the time the press was
allowed to investigate the battlefield, fighting had largely ceased.48
Press-military relations deteriorated further during Operation
Desert Storm.49 President George H.W. Bush stated in 1990 that
media coverage of the War would "not be a new Vietnam," which
some journalists interpreted to mean that they would not have the
opportunity to broadcast negative reports from the field.50 Emblematic
of the administration's opinion of the press during Desert Storm was

cover the same war on a limited battlefield, a problem exacerbated in the Gulf by an
increase in the number of correspondents.").
43. Belknap, supra note 19, at 104. Jacobs writes:
Still smarting from their initial exclusion from the battlefield in Grenada, many in the press
viewed the Sidle Report as a boon, because while the report advocated a pool system, it
made no mention of field censorship, military escorts, or even tight control over access.
Therefore, when the Pentagon announced the formation of a Department of Defense press
pool in October 1984, all major news organizations with the exceptions of Time Magazine
signed up readily, and Time eventually relented when faced with the prospect of being
excluded from major military stories.

Jacobs Note, supra note 20, at 685; Charles Mohr, The Continuing Battle O ver Covering
Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1984, at A24; Barry Zorthian, Now, How Will Unfettered Media
Cover Combat?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1984, at A31.
See, e.g., Richard Halloran, Weinberger and the Press: An Ebb in the Flow, N.Y.
Aug. 25, 1984, at 6 (quoting Pentagon spokesman Michael I. Burch as stating "How
the press is to operate must be decided on a case-by-case basis.").
44.

TIMES,

45. Belknap, supra note 19, at 104-05.
46. G ANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 16; Jacobs Note, supra note 20, at 685;
Schmeisser, supra note 35, at 22.
47. Schmeisser, supra note 35.
48. David A. Frenznick, The First Amendment on the Battlefield: A Constitutional
Analysis of Press Access to Military Operations in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf,
23 PAC. L.J. 315, 325 (1992) ("By the time the military allowed nonpool reporters to land
their aircraft late in the evening on December 21, President Bush had already declared the
operation 'pretty well wrapped-up.' " (footnotes omitted)); Patrick J. Sloyan, The War You
Won 't See: Why the Bush Administration Plans to Restrict Coverage of Gulf Combat, WAS H .
POST, Jan. 13, 1991, at C2.
49. Porch, supra note 12, at 95 ("If Panama did little to foster trust between the media
and the military, the war in the Persian Gulf lifted matters to a new plateau of acrimony.").
50. Justin Ewers, Is the New News Good News?, U.S.
2003, at 48.

NEWS & WORLD REP.,

Apr. 7,
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Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's comment, "I do not look on the
press as an asset. Frankly, I looked on it as a problem to be
managed."51 One Air Force officer was quoted as stating, "I'm not a
great fan of the press, and I want you to know where we stand with
each other. I suppose the press has its purpose. But one thing is
certain: you can't do me any good, and you sure as hell can do me
harm."52 Such rhetoric was fueled, in part, by the juxtaposition of the
military victory in Grenada in the absence of press coverage and the
well-documented defeat in Vietnam.53
The resulting press restrictions included prepublication review of
media reports, a press blackout during the first day of the invasion,
limitations on access to information and locations, and prolonged use
of press pools.54 Prepublication review proved to be a particularly
effective and self-enforcing method of censorship. Although nominally
justified to prevent the release of sensitive information,55 military
censors sometimes requested alterations as a method of skewing the
war coverage. In one case, censors required a reporter to change a
description of troops returning from a mission from "giddy" to
"proud";56 another required the deletion of a description of American
troops watching pornography;57 and many stories deemed offensive to
Saudi culture were altered, such as a report about soldiers' celebration
of Mardi Gras.58 Although reporters had the opportunity to appeal
51. P xii. For an interesting comparison, consider Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld's recent statement: "Well I think that as a principle, given our Constitution and
the way our free system works, that it's always helpful, generally almost always helpful to
have the press there to see things and be able to report and comment and provide infor
mation about what's taking place. " Meeting with Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs and Bureau Chiefs, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 30, 2002), at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2002/t1 1012002_t1030sd.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2004).
52. Browne, supra note 32, at 27.
53. Id. at 30.
54. P. xii; Richard L. Berke, News From Gulf Is Good, and Cheney's Press Curbs A re
Loosened, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1991, at Al 7 (hereinafter Berke, News From Gulf]; Howard
Kurtz, Journalists Say 'Pools' Don't Work, WASH. POST, Feb. 1 1, 1991, at Al [hereinafter
Kurtz, Journalists].
55. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Guidelines for News Media (Jan. 7, 1991). The Department
of Defense writes:
Security at the source will be the policy. In the event of hostilities, pool products will be
subject to security review prior to release to determine if they contain information that
would jeopardize an operation of the security of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will not be
withheld just because it is embarrassing or contains criticism.

Id. , reprinted in Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1576

(S.D.N.Y. 1991).

56. Kurtz, Journalists, supra note 54.
57. Jason DeParle, Keeping the News in Step: Are the Pentagon 's Gulf War Rules Here to
Stay?, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1991 , at A9.
58. GANNETT
note 54.

FOUNDATION,

supra note 24, at 29; Berke, News from Gulf, supra
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decisions to censor, and if no agreement could be reached on appeal
the decision to publish was left to the news organization,59 the time
sensitive nature of reporting rendered the process worthless.6() Instead,
reporters generally agreed to whatever alterations military censors
proposed in exchange for prompt dispatch of their stories.61
Outright censorship and prepublication review were not, however,
the military's principal means of controlling media coverage.62 Instead,
the military relied on limiting access to potentially damaging
information, thereby avoiding the need to censor.63 Reporters were
excluded from the frontlines unless they registered with the military,
signed an agreement to comply with military rules, were in a press
pool, and were accompanied by a military escort.64 As a result,
reporters found themselves under the watchful, interview-inhibiting
gaze of a public affairs officer.65 Requests to visit the frontlines were
frequently denied due to lack of transport or security concerns. 66 A
principal complaint among reporters was that, because the pools were
too few in number, many news outlets such as the Village Voice, The
Nation, Harper's, and Mother Jones were denied access entirely.67
Journalists who operated outside the pool system often dealt with
harassment by the American military.68 Some were arrested and
removed from the country;69 others were denied Geneva Convention
59. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Guidelines for News Media (Jan. 14, 1991), reprinted in
Nation Magazine, 762 F. Supp. at 1577-78.
60. Jacobs Note, supra note 20, at 687.
61. Id.; see GANNETI FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 18 (describing the lack of timely
appeal from the security-review process as likely resulting in "a kind of de facto
censorship"); Browne, supra note 32, at 27 ("[T]o make newspaper deadlines . . . I agreed to
all the proposed changes, on the condition that our copy is dispatched hastily.").
62. GANNETI FOUNDATION, supra note 24 ("Fewer than one in five (17 percent)
reporters said they were ever unable to file stories because of security review.").
63. See id. ("The real problem was access, getting to the story. "); Porch, supra note 12,
at 95 ("The primary issue was what seemed to journalists to amount to censorship and
manipulation, arising from tight restrictions on all media travel. . . . [M]ost reporters never
saw the war . . . . ").
64. GANNETI FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 19; Major Lisa J. Turner & Lynn G.
Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 43 (2001); Richard L. Berke,
Pentagon Defends Coverage Rules, While Admitting to Some Delays, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
1991, at A14 [hereinafter Berke, Pentagon Defends].

65.

GANNETI FOUNDATION, supra

note 24, at 19.

66. Porch, supra note 12, at 95.
67. See Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); R.W. Apple, Jr., Press and Military: Old Suspicions, N.Y. DMES, Feb. 4, 1991 (stating
that although the plaintiffs were primarily alternative and progressive news outlets, they did
not allege that their exclusion was a product of view-point discrimination).
68. Kevin P. Kenealey, Comment, The Persian Gulf War and the Press: ls there a
Constitutional Right ofA ccess to Military Operations?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 287, 291 (1992).
69. Browne, supra note 32.
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cards, which would identify th�m as noncombatants.70 Some journalists
reported frequent detentions and hostile encounters with American,
Iraqi, and Saudi forces.71 Many reporters found such conflict
unavoidable; in one survey, many said that the only way to get access
to real information in a timely fashion was to operate outside of the
Pentagon-imposed restrictions, thereby exposing themselves to official
sanctions.72
Partly in response to the restrictive nature of the pool system,
some reporters self-embedded, often with the aid of the more
sympathetic units they were trying to cover. Malcolm Browne
reported that some journalists were given uniforms and gear by troops
and field officers so as to look inconspicuous, hidden from the gaze of
press-hostile commanders.73 He quoted one such reporter lamenting,
"I spend two-thirds of my time evading the [military police] and only
one-third interviewing troops."74 Others became commanders' "pet
journalists," bartering favorable coverage for access to the front.75
Some even embedded with Saudi and Egyptian units, who were
occasionally more hospitable to reporters.76
Response by the media and legal communities to the restrictions
was almost uniformly negative.77 Walter Cronkite, testifying before a
Senate committee, advocated a return to the free-roaming days of
Vietnam, stating, "I don't know [if the public had received complete
news coverage] because the American press is not able to go
everywhere. We have no independent monitor on whether the system
is working or not."78 Many in the press feared that they were being

70. Kenealey, supra note 68, at 291.
71. See
291-92.

GANNEIT FOUNDATION,

supra note 24, at 19; Kenealey, supra note 68, at

72. GANNETI FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 32 ("Four-fifths went outside established
channels to find information, while two-thirds (68 percent) said that they knew journalists
who violated the guidelines. . . . Most said that the only way to get access to any real
information in a timely fashion . . . was to operate outside the [Pentagon's Joint Information
Bureau].").
73. Browne, supra note 32, at 30.
74. Id.
75. Porch, supra note 12, at 96.
76.

GANNEIT FOUNDATION, supra

note 24, at 66.

77. See Apple, supra note 67 ("[M]any of the more than 500 journalists assigned to
cover the war express intense dissatisfaction with the quality of information furnished to
them by the United States command and even more with restrictions on their ability to go
see for themselves."); William Boot, The Press Stands Alone, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Mar./Apr. 1991, at 23 ("Reporters fumed that these rules undercut 'the public's right to
know' . . . . "); and sources cited infra note 80.
78. Berke, Pentagon Defends, supra note 64.
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spoon-fed misinformation during news briefings.79 Reiterating the
arguments made in the wake of Grenada, many legal commentators
claimed that the restrictions deprived the media of its right of access to
the front and that prepublication review constituted an impermissible
prior restraint.80 Even some members of the military who were active
during the Vietnam War were critical of the degree of press restriction
during Desert Storm. General Wesley Clark, for example, later
remarked that the lack of press coverage meant that " [t]here was
nobody there to tell the story of the youth of American going out and
doing this great mission .... It was a missed opportunity that I hope
we don't repeat."81
The first indication that the Gulf War would mark the highpoint of
military censorship came in 1992, when in the face of growing media
pressure, the military agreed to renegotiate the recommendations of
the Sidle Panel.82 Winning the public relations war at home, some
argued, would require more access than previously granted.83 The
process concluded with the publication of Department of Defense
Directive 5122.5, which embodies the principles of 1) open and
independent coverage; 2) limited use of press pools; 3) access to all
major military units; 4) noninterference with reporting by public
affairs officers; and 5) provision of military transport to the press.84
The directive left unclear the exact meaning of "open and
independent coverage," which members of the press would be given

79. GANNETT FOUNDATION, supra note 24, at 20; see also Michael W. Klein, The
Censor's Red Flair, the Bombs Bursting in A ir: The Constitutionality of the Desert Storm
Media Restrictions, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1037, 1064-65 (1992); Apple, supra note 67
(describing misinformation given about the battle for Khafji).
80. E.g., Frenznick, supra note 48; Klein, supra note 79; Gara LaMarche, Managed
News, Stifled Views: Free Expression as a Casualty of the Persian Gulf War, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
45 (1991); Committee on Civil Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Military Restrictions on Press Coverage: The Unaccceptability of the Pentagon 's
Policies During the Persian Gulf Conflict, 46 REC. Ass N . BAR CITY N.Y. 843 (1991),
reprinted in 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 421 (1992); Jacobs Note, supra note 20; Kenealey, supra
note 68.
HUM. RTS.

'

81. Tammy L. Miracle, The A rmy and Embedded Media, MI L.
41, 41.

REV.,

Sept./Oct. 2003, at

82. Terry, supra note 21, at 3.
83. News Transcript, Dep't of Defense, ASD PA Clarke meeting with Bureau Chiefs
(Nov. 7, 2001), at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t1 1 112001_t1107bc.html
(quoting Owen Ullman as saying "I would suggest to you that there is a linkage between
perhaps losing the PR war and not allowing American news media to have greater access to
cover the war and perhaps provide the fair balanced picture that you want ").
84. William E. Lee, "Security Review" and the First Amendment, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 743, 746-47 (2002); Terry, supra note 21, at 3-4; Department of Defense Directive
5122.5 (Sept. 27, 2000) [hereinafter DOD Directive], available at http://www.dtic.mil
/whs/directives/corres/html/51225.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004).
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military transportation and access to units, and the status of security
review.85
The press restrictions loosened a bit further during the War in
Afghanistan. Foreshadowing the extensive embedding to come, the
military invited a few reporters to be stationed on battleships and
cargo planes in the region and subjected their reports to only minimal
security review.86 This relaxation of media restrictions was in part a
response to criticisms stemming from Desert Storm, in part an effort
to curry favorable press coverage and in part a method of avoiding the
First Amendment challenges brought during past wars.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO PAST MILITARY PRACTICE
This recent history of press-military relations produced several
First Amendment lawsuits, which focused on two issues. First, security
review of reporters' stories is a classic prior restraint, which outside
the national security context, is presumptively unconstitutional.
Second, plaintiffs and commentators have repeatedly argued that the
press has a First Amendment right of access to war zones. Due to
various justiciability limitations, however, courts have repeatedly
refused to reach these claims on the merits. Part A provides a recent
history of battlefield First Amendment litigation, and demonstrates
that courts have relied on various justiciability doctrines to avoid
settling these difficult issues. Part B does what the courts generally
have not: evaluate the press's arguments on the merits. It argues that
the Pentagon's press restrictions, though possibly ill-advised, were
consistent with the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions.
A. History of Legal Challenges to Past Military Practices
The media seldom took post-Vietnam restrictions on reporting
lightly; each new conflict begat new litigation. These challenges
invariably sought to establish a First Amendment right of access to the
battlefield. The military has, however, seldom had to seriously defend
a challenge to its press restrictions. The Pentagon has primarily
depended on the mootness and ripeness doctrines, as well as the time
sensitive nature of news, to discourage suit and insulate its programs
from review. Modern war happens so rapidly and courts move so
slowly that most major fighting is over and press restrictions are lifted
before any court can rule on their legality. And since the value of any
piece of news diminishes rapidly, the press has little incentive to
litigate any particular application of security review.

85. See Terry, supra note 21, at 4-5 (discussing ambiguities in DOD Directive 5122.5).
86. Lee, supra note 84, at 748-49.
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Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler Magazine, brought the first
battlefield access case during the invasion of Grenada.87 Flynt filed his
suit on October 26, 1983, the day after the invasion began.88 Because
of the brevity of the invasion, the press ban was lifted the very next
d ay.89 Eight months later, the district court declared the request moot
with no reasonable expectation that the controversy would recur.90
Each military operation, the court held, was unique, and there was no
demonstrated probability that an objectionable press ban would be
imposed again in the future.91 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal in a per curiam opinion.92
A similar controversy reoccurred, however, during Desert Storm.
The Nation Magazine and others brought suit, contending that the
military's discriminatory granting of access to press pools violated the
First Amendment.93 The plaintiffs argued that the press had a right to
unlimited access to the battlefield and requested that the court enjoin
the Department of Defense from using pools that exclude some
members of the press.94 Despite finding "support for the proposition
that the press has at least some minimal right of access to view and
report about major events that affect the functioning of government,
including, for example, an overt combat operation,"95 the court
refused to rule on the merits, finding that the plaintiffs' request for
injunctive relief was moot in light of the end of the War.96 With regard
to the request for declaratory relief, the court held the claim not moot
because capable of repetition.97 Nevertheless, the court declined to
answer the question in the abstract.98
Perhaps anticipating the changes to come, Larry Flynt again filed
for an injunction and declaratory relief during the War in Afghanistan
to prevent Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from "interfering
with [Flynt's] asserted First Amendment right to have [Hustler
87. Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1984).
88. Kathleen A. Buck, The First Amendment - An Absolute Right?, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 851 , 852 (1985).
89. Flynt, 588 F. Supp. at 58.
90. ld.
91. ld. at 59.
92. Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Judge Harry T. Edwards stated
in a concurring opinion that, although the case was moot, it "raised a potentially important
issue of constitutional law." ld. at 136 (Edwards, J., concurring).
93. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
94. ld. at 1561, 1569.
95. ld. at 1572.
96. ld. at 1570.
97. ld.
98. ld. at 1572.
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Magazine] correspondents accompany American troops on the
ground."99 The court held that the request for an injunction was
premature because the Department of Defense had not yet actually
denied Hustler access to U.S. troops,1 00 and exercised its discretion not
to consider the declaratory relief.101 The District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed on alternate grounds, holding that there is no constitutional
right to embed with U.S. troops and that Department of Defense
Directive 5 112.5, as applied, did not violate the First Amendment.102
Given this history of frequently having wartime media-access
litigation mooted by the outbreak of peace, it was not surprising that
Flynt filed prematurely, resulting in the district court finding the case
not ripe. The District of Columbia Circuit's opinion aside, challenges
to wartime press restraints show an uncanny ability to evade judicial
review, which has prompted proposals to designate special courts to
ensure prompt hearings and "force the military to clearly justify" its
wartime restrictions.103 Until that occurs, the mootness and ripeness
and courts' traditional reluctance to interfere with military operations
doctrines combined with the brief nature of most military operations
are likely to insulate most future military press restrictions from
judicial scrutiny.

B.

The First Amendment Claims on the Merits

The press and commentators have commonly asserted that past
military practices violated the First Amendment in two regards. First,
some have argued that the First Amendment guarantees the press at
least a limited right to gather war-related news, which requires
physical access to the battlefield. The argument relies on Supreme
Court precedent granting public access to criminal trials as a First
Amendment right. The battlefield, however, is a context far removed
from a criminal trial, placing the argument on shaky ground. The
District of Columbia Circuit's recent rejection of a similar right to

99. Flynt v. LFP, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 94, 94 (D.D.C. 2003).
100. Id. at 101-03.
101. Id. at 109-110.
102. Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Flynt did eventually triumph in
Iraq, however, by convincing the Pentagon to allow him to embed a Hustler reporter with a
military unit during that conflict. Observer - U.S., FIN. nMES, Feb. 24, 2003, available at
2003 WL 3919881.
103. Michael D. Steger, Slicing the Gordian Knot: A Proposal to Reform Military
Regulation of Media Coverage of Combat Operations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 957, 1003-06 (1994);
see also Matthew Silverman, Comment, National Security and the First Amendment: A
Judicial Role in Maximizing Public Access to Information, 78 IND. L.J. 1101, 1118 (2003)
(advocating the creation of a "National Security Court" to provide speedy review to First
Amendment wartime access claims).

1344

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 102:1329

embed with troops further suggests that reporters do not have First
Amendment right of access to war zones.
Second, many have argued more persuasively that the
prepublication review of news stories during Desert Storm was an
impermissible prior restraint. The argument relies, generally, on the
long tradition of hostility to prior restraints and, in particular, on the
Court's decision in New York Times v. United States, refusing to grant
an injunction against publication of classified documents pertaining to
the Vietnam War.1 04 As compelling as the arguments against prior
restraints are, however, the Court's subsequent decision in United
States v. Snepp105 has placed substantial limits on the fractured and
confusing New York Times opinion in cases when the plaintiff either
consented to the restraint or occupied a position of trust with the
government.
Security review and access limitations were applied sparingly, if at
all, during Operation Iraqi Freedom.106 Nonetheless, analysis of these
issues remains relevant because the Pentagon has not disavowed their
use in future wars.107 As history indicates, the Pentagon adjusts its
media policies according to the needs of the operation. Accordingly,
there are no guarantees that restrictions similar to those in place
during Desert Storm will not be imposed in the future.
1.

Access

The First Amendment right of access first appeared in Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia,108 in which the Court struck down a trial
judge's order to close a murder trial to the public.109 The Court has
rested the right of access to criminal trials on two factors. First,
although there was no majority opinion in Richmond Newspapers, a
plurality relied heavily on the extensive historical tradition of public
trials.110 Second, in a subsequent case, a majority clarified that the
holding also rested on the notion that public scrutiny of criminal
proceedings serves an important role in the criminal process because it
"enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding

104. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
105. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
106. P. 367; pp. 415-16 apP.. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 6).
107. See, e.g., News Transcript, U.S. Dep't of Def., Secretary Rumsfeld Meeting with
Media Pool B ureau Chiefs (Oct. 18, 2001), http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/200 1
/t10192001_t1018bc.html (last visited May 20, 2004) (quoting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
as stating that he can conceive of situations where security review would be appropriate).
108. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 581.
110. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-70 (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J.).
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process . . . fosters an appearance of fairness . .. and serve[s] as a
check upon the judicial process."111 The Court added that access may
be restricted by narrowly tailored means to serve a compelling
interest.112
The Court has never extended the First Amendment right of
access beyond the confines of judicial proceedings.113 Nevertheless,
commentators and media litigants have pressed for its application to
the battlefield.114 Although no court has addressed the issue,115 it is
unlikely that a request for access to the battlefield would survive
either prong of the Richmond Newspapers test, even assuming that the
test is properly applied outside of the context of judicial proceedings.
Although its history has been interspersed with periods of openness,
warfare has frequently led to the exclusion of civilians and the media
from the battlefield.116 War therefore lacks the historical tradition of
continuous public access that was crucial in Richmond Newspapers.
Nor does open access to the battlefield serve as compelling an
interest as open criminal trials. Although the media can check the
military in the same manner that it does the judiciary in a criminal trial
by, for example, exposing civilian casualties and military overreaching,
a criminal trial's functioning seldom depends on the element of
111. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
112. Id. at 606-07.
113. Ctr. for Nat'! Security Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(stating that the Supreme Court has not applied the Richmond Newspapers test outside the
context of criminal proceedings).
114. See, e.g., Flynt, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Kenealy, supra note 68; John E.
Smith, From the Front Lines to the Front Page: Media A ccess to War in the Persian Gulf and
Beyond, 26 COLUM J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 291 (1993).
115. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the First
Amendment does not guarantee the press the right to embed with military units, but the
court did not address whether unilateral reporters may be excluded from the battlefield.
Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In doing so, the D.C. Circuit limited
application of the Richmond Newspapers test solely to criminal proceedings. Id. at 704. At
least two other courts have disagreed by applying the Richmond Newspapers test to
deportation proceedings. New Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). The D.C. Circuit relied
on cases where the court had held that the government did not have an affirmative duty to
disclose certain information, such as the names of post-9/11 detainees or addresses of
arrestees. See Flynt, 355 F.3d at 704 (discussing Center for National Security Studies v. Dept.
of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). The court did not address whether the First
Amendment guarantees a right of access to Iraq as a unilateral. Id. at 702 (stating that the
challenged DOD directive did not prevent Flynt from accessing the battlefield as a
unilateral). A unilateral seeking access to the battlefield, however, is not requesting that the
government affirmatively provide information or accommodations. Rather, he is merely
requesting that the government allow him to move freely about a large expanse of land.
116. Flynt, 355 F.3d at 704-05; Cassell, supra note 21, at 959-60; William A. Wilcox, Jr.,
Security Review of Media Reports on Military Operations: A Response to Professor Lee, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 355, 359-60 (2003); see 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 170 (J. Elliot ed.
1881) (recounting the Patrick Henry's assertion that details of military operations need not
be publicized despite his general opposition to government secrecy).
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surprise. Secrecy is critical to military victory in a way that it rarely is
to criminal justice. Given that battlefield access fails the first two
elements of the Court's test, it matters little that the press restrictions
have seldom been narrowly tailored.117
2.

Prior Restraint

Even though there is no First Amendment right of media access to
the battlefield, there remains the question of whether the military can
condition a grant of access on the submission of stories to security
review prior to publication, as it did during Desert Storm.118 That
process occasionally resulted in military censors requesting that
changes be made, ostensibly to preserve security, but occasionally for
more political reasons.119
Modern prior restraint doctrine in the contest of national security
stems from New York Times v. United States,120 in which the Court
declined to grant the government's request to enjoin publication of the
Pentagon Papers, a classified military study of the Vietnam War. In
addition to the per curium opinion striking down the lower court's
injunction, each justice wrote separately. The result ultimately rested
on two factors. First, three justices emphasized that Congress has not
authorized the injunction.121 Second, three justices argued that a
rigorous form of strict scrutiny be applied, requiring that the
government demonstrate that publication "inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling
the safety of a transport already at sea."122
The Pentagon Papers case was, however, severely undermined a
decade later in Snepp v. United States.123 In Snepp, the CIA sought to
enforce a secrecy agreement with a former agent.124 Snepp's
employment contract required him to submit manuscripts pertaining
to his work with the Agency prior to publication.125 Snepp argued that
117. But see Frenznick, supra note 48, at 348-52 (concluding that the press does enjoy a
right of access to the battlefield); Kenealey, supra note 68, at 309-24 (same); Klein, supra
note 79, at 1068-72 (same).
118. Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1576 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); U.S. Dep't of Def., Guidelines for News Media (Jan. 14, 1991).
119. See supra notes 54-61.
120. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curium).
121. Id. at 745 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 732 (White, J., concurring); id. at 730
(Stewart, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 732-27 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
732-33, 40 (White, J., concurring).
123. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
124. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508.
125. Id. at 507-08.
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he had a First Amendment right to publish his book without
submitting it to a censor, that any waiver of that right was invalid, and
that this prior restraint was imposed without explicit authority from
Congress.126 The Court rejected these arguments, holding that Snepp
had breached a fiduciary obligation when he published a book about
CIA activities in Vietnam without obtaining clearance from the
Agency.127
In granting the government's request for an injunction requiring
Snepp to submit future writings to prepublication review,128 the Court
emphasized two factors. First, Snepp had voluntarily waived his right
to be free from prepublication review.129 Second, in dicta the Court
stated that because Snepp's employment relationship necessitated a
high degree of trust, the government could impose reasonable
limitations on his speech even in the absence of an express waiver.130
The majority neither discussed nor attempted to distinguish the
Pentagon Papers case.
Snepp poses a substantial obstacle to First Amendment challenges
to security review by the military. It forecloses the argument that an
injunction against publication requires congressional authorization.
The only statute the CIA relied on was a generally worded statement
in the National Security Act of 1947 that the Director of the CIA was
responsible for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure."131 Snepp, therefore, allows the Executive to
impose prior restraints when Congress has at best spoken
ambiguously.
Snepp also threatens the Pentagon Papers requirement that the
government demonstrate that the speech would threaten a compelling
government interest. None of the information Snepp sought to publish
was classified; his sole indiscretion was his failure to submit the book
to prepublication review.132 The Court merely relied on the lower
court's finding that an agent's publication of unreviewed material "can
be detrimental to vital national interests" by potentially discouraging
foreign intelligence sources from cooperating with the CIA.133 Such a
harm is indirect, not inevitable, and not immediate. Nor is it of the
same magnitude as imperiling the safety of a transport at sea. The
126. See United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 931 (4th Cir. 1979).
127. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507.
128. Id. at 516 (reinstating judgment of district court, which included injunction).
129. Id. at 509 n.3.
130. Id. at 509 n.3, 510-11.
131. See Snepp, 595 F.2d at 932 (quoting National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §
403(d)(3) (2000)).
132. See id. at 929.
133. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 511-12 (emphasis added).
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Court found it sufficient that preventing the threat of harm posed by
Snepp's speech was a substantial interest and the prior restraint was a
reasonable means of achieving that end.134
The Court has therefore applied two very different tests when
evaluating prior restraints in the national security context. Under the
Pentagon Papers standard, the prior restraint must be congressionally
authorized and survive strict scrutiny. Under Snepp, the prior restraint
can be imposed in the absence of congressional authorization and
need merely survive intermediate scrutiny. Because the Snepp Court
made no effort to distinguish the Pentagon Papers case, it left unclear
when each standard applies.
The two decisions can most easily be reconciled by analysis of the
two variables the Court found critical in Snepp: waiver and trust. In
the Pentagon Papers case, the New York Times neither waived its First
Amendment rights, nor enjoyed a relationship of trust with the
government. Where a relationship of trust of the order of that
between a CIA agent and the government exists, the prior restraint
must survive intermediate scrutiny. Where no relationship of trust
exists and the speaker to be enjoined has not waived his First
Amendment rights, strict scrutiny is appropriate.135 What the cases do
not directly answer is what standard applied to war correspondents
during Desert Storm, who waived their right to be free from prior
restraint but lacked a relationship of trust with the government.136
The two cases can be visualized using a two-by-two matrix:
Waiver

No Waiver

Trust/Employment

Snepp

Snepp (dicta)

No Trust/No
Employment

Desert Storm
Reporters

Pentagon
Pavers

134. Id. at 509 n.3. The opinion actually suggests some uncertainty about whether the
government's interest must be compelling or merely substantial. See id. The Court first
declared that "[T]he CIA [is entitled] to protect substantial government interests by
imposing reasonable restrictions . . . . " Id. In the next sentence, however, the Court stated,
"The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information to
our national security . . . . The agreement that Snepp signed is a reasonable means for
protecting this vital interest." Id. (citations omitted).
135. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
136. Judge Cassell has, however, argued that Desert Storm reporters did enjoy a
relationship of trust with the military due to their receipt of sensitive information, and were
therefore similarly situated to Snepp. Cassell, supra note 21, at 951. The extensive Pentagon
imposed media restrictions and resulting press backlash belie this claim. See supra notes 4981 and accompanying text. Whatever trust the two parties enjoyed, it clearly did not match
that which is expected between the CIA and one of its agents.
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This reasoning suggests that the prior restraints imposed on Desert
Storm reporters would be analyzed under Snepp's more lenient
intermediate scrutiny test and be upheld. If the Pentagon Papers
standard applied, the only relevant variable in determining the
applicable test would be the existence of a relationship of trust.
Regardless of the existence or non-existence of a waiver, the level of
scrutiny the Court would apply would hinge solely on the relationship
of the speaker to the government. Some commentators have adopted
this view, arguing that upholding waivers of First Amendment rights
allows private speakers to "bargain away" the public's interest in
listening to the speech in question.137
While making waivers irrelevant to First Amendment analysis can
plausibly be defended on this ground, the Snepp Court clearly rejected
it, stating, "When Snepp accepted employment with the CIA, he
voluntarily signed the agreement that expressly obligated him to
submit any proposed publication for prior review. He does not claim
that he executed this agreement under duress. Indeed, he voluntarily
reaffirmed his obligation when he left the Agency."138 In dicta, the
Court then stated that Snepp's employment relationship, even absent
an express waiver, was sufficient to sustain the prior restraint.139 Given
that the employment relationship was alone a sufficient basis to enjoin
Snepp's speech, the Court would have had no reason to first discuss
the existence and validity of the waiver if it were not also a sufficient
ground for the decision. Furthermore, the Court cited with approval
lower court opinions in A lfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby140 and United
States v. Marchetti141 that had explicitly relied on the existence of
identical CIA contracts in enjoining the former employee's speech. To
give meaning to this analysis, the waiver and the high-trust
employment relationship must be interpreted as each independently
sufficient to sustain the prior restraint.
This attempted reconciliation of the Snepp and Pentagon Papers
decisions supports the conclusion that, pursuant to Desert Storm
reporter's agreement to submit their stories to security review, the
Court would likely have applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the
practice. The military had a substantial, if not compelling, interest in
preventing the release of sensitive information during wartime, and
137. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 396-97 (1985); see also Jonathan
C. Medow, The First Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 775, 811-814 (1982) (arguing that a waiver is "relevant only to the extent that the
document evidences, as would a statute, the state's desire to impose the restriction at issue"
(citation omitted}).
138. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
139. Id.
140. 509 F.2d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 1975).
141. 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972).
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the flexible security review system, which gave the ultimate
publication decision to the reporter, was a reasonable means of
achieving that end. The lack of a relationship of trust, while a plausible
means of distinguishing Snepp, is in tension with the Court's method
of analysis.
Ill.

REPORTING FROM IRAQ

Regardless of the merits of war correspondents' claims during past
military operations, the advent of embedded reporting and the
opening of Iraq to unilateral reporters deftly put them to rest.
Through an examination of the stories reported in Embedded: The
Media at War in Iraq, this Part contends - with some caveats - that
the embed program was largely a success. Section A argues that the
embed program remedied the First Amendment deficiencies of past
war efforts. Reporters enjoyed widespread access to the battlefield
with virtually no censorship. The embed program was not, however,
without limitations; Section B explores several of them. Embedding
resulted in an alignment between reporter and subject that
undermined objectivity, and the limits on reporters' independent
mobility limited the types of stories they could pursue.
Although embeds have so far enjoyed minimal interference with
their reporting efforts, the imposition of censorship and security
review in future operations is still a possibility. Section B also argues
that should such measures be implemented and challenged in court,
embeds may discover that by integrating themselves so completely
within the military environment, they have sacrificed a degree of First
Amendment protection. In furtherance of a doctrine of military
deference, the Court has greatly limited the protection of civilian and
servicemen speech within a military environment.
Section C contends that the deficiencies identified in Section B,
were remedied by unilateral reporting, which proved to be a necessary
complement to embedding. Unilaterals were free to travel where U.S.
soldiers did not, and their reports were presumptively free of the bias
that may have influenced embeds. Their stories allowed for a more
complete and accurate picture of the War to emerge than would have
been available from embeds alone. Perhaps most importantly, the
opening of Iraq to unilaterals secured the public's interests in
obtaining war-related news from reporters enjoying full First
Amendment protection and a fully competitive marketplace of war
related ideas and news. The relaxed restrictions on unilateral
reporting, therefore, comprised an essential component of the success
of the entire program of news reporting from the second Iraq War.
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A. The Successes of the Embed Program
To implement the embed program, the Pentagon promulgated its
"Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media During Possible
Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands"
("PAG") (reprinted at pp. 401-17 app.). The PAG aspired to achieve
largely what the press had been demanding for decades: access
without security review. It was remarkably successful in achieving
that goal.
The PAG envisions "long term, minimally restrictive access . . . to
facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage of U.S. forces in combat" as
part of a "long-term commitment to supporting our democratic ideals"
and "ensur[ing] a full understanding of all operations."142 The PAG
grants broad access, including observation of combat mission, mission
preparation, and debriefing. 143 Contrary to the practice during Desert
Storm, the PAG does not consider the lack of a military escort or the
reporter's safety to be sufficient reasons to preclude media access.144
The PAG also requires commanders to provide for all of a reporter's
physical needs such as transportation of equipment, rations, and
medical care, as well as assistance in transmitting stories.145
Officially, embeds were free to report new� critical of the military;
the PAG allows only an extremely minimal degree of security
review.146 In a refreshing rejection of the precedent of Desert Storm,
142. Pp. 402-03 app.

(quoting PAG, supra note 14, at paras. 2.A-B).

143. Pp. 402-03 app.

(quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 2.B).

144. Specifically, PAG states:
An escort may be assigned at the discretion of the unit commander. The absence of a PA
escort is not a reason to preclude media access to operations.
Commanders will ensure the media are provided with every opportunity to observe actual
combat operations. The personal safety of correspondents is not a reason to exclude them
from combat areas.
Pp. 405-06 app.

(quoting PAG, supra note

145. Pp. 405-06 app.

14, at paras. 3.F-G).

(quoting PAG, supra note

14, at para. 2.C).

146. The PAG states:
The primary safeguard will be to brief media in advance about what information is sensitive
and what the parameters are for covering this type of information. If media are inadvertently
exposed to sensitive information they should be briefed after exposure on what information
they should avoid covering. In instances where a unit commander or the <!esignated
representative determines that coverage of a story will involve exposure to sensitive
information beyond the scope of what may be protected by prebriefing or debriefing, but
coverage of which is in the best interests of the DOD, the commander may offer access if the
reporter agrees to a security review of their coverage. Agreement to security review in
exchange for this type of access must be strictly voluntary and if the reporter does not agree,
then access may not be granted. If a security review is agreed to, it will not involve any
editorial changes; it will be conducted solely to ensure that no sensitive or classified
information is included in the product. If such information is found, the media will be asked
to remove that information from the product and/or embargo the product until such
information is no longer classified or sensitive. Reviews are to be done as soon as practical so
as not to interrupt combat operations nor delay reporting.
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the PAG prefaces its ground rules with the statement that they "are in
no way intended to prevent release of derogatory, embarrassing,
negative, or uncomplimentary information."147 When dealing with
sensitive information and embeds, the PAG requires commanders to
ask themselves "Why not release?" as opposed to "Why release?" and
encourages such decisions to be made promptly.148 The restrictions the
PAG did impose were reasonable, being largely related to strategic
information useful to the enemy149 and the specific identity of U.S.
casualties before their families were notified.150
For the first time in decades, journalists' responses to military
press controls were positive. Nancy Bernhard of the Nieman Report
described embedding as a "win-win policy."151 John Koopman of the
San Francisco Chronicle agreed, "It's the way wars should always have
been covered, and probably it's the wave of the future" (p. 121).
Jerusalem Post reporter Janine Zacharia concurred, " [T]he embed
process overall was very good. . . . In general, being an embed was an
invaluable experience... . I haven't talked to many embeds who had a
negative experience" (p. 239). Rem Reider of the American
Journalism Review gushed that embedding was "a home run as far as
the news media - and the American people - are concerned."152
The Pentagon also viewed the program as a success.153 The embed
coverage produced "a lot of firsthand accounts - and really
compassionate accounts - of what it's like to be a soldier or what it's
like to be on a battlefield. The military knew they would get that kind
of 'positive reporting' " (p. 262). Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria
Clarke repeatedly praised the program for providing sympathetic
stories of "the wonderful dedication and discipline of the coalition

Pp. 415-16 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 6.A.1).
147. P. 408 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 4).
148. P. 407 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 3.Q) ("The standard for release
of information should be to ask, 'Why not release' vice 'Why release.' Decisions should be
made ASAP, preferably in minutes, not hours.").
149. See, e.g., pp. 411-13 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at paras. 4.G.1-19)
(prohibiting reporting of specific numbers of troops, tanks and planes, future operations,
rules of engagement, tactics, effectiveness of enemy tactics, etc.).
150. P. 413 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 4.H.2).
151. See, e.g. , Nancy Bernhard, Embedding Reporters on the Frontline,
Summer 2003, at 87.

NIEMAN

REPORTS,

152. Rem Rieder, In the Zone, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May 2003, at 6.
153. See, e.g., pp. 269-72 (statement of Sergeant Major Carol Sobel, Public Affairs
Officer); Dan Miller, General Labels Embedding a Success, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS,
Sept. 5, 2003, at 807; Pentagon Mulls Adding 'Media Embed' to Public Affairs Doctrine,
INSIDE THE AIR FORCE, June 20, 2003, 2003 WL 7602358 (quoting Pentagon spokeswoman
Victoria Clarke as stating "I am quite confident people feel so good about this process that
you'll see more people in the military embracing it.").
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forces."154 Other benefits cited include dampening the effects of Iraqi
propaganda and second-guessing by media pundits.155 The Pentagon
has since announced it expects to continue the program during future
military conflicts.156
Contrary to reservations expressed by many within the media,
embeds did not operate merely as a cheering section for the war effort.
Many reports critical of the U.S. military originated from embeds.
Two reporters, broadcast journalist Mike Cerre and The Washington
Post's William Branigin, witnessed and reported on checkpoint
shootings of cars filled with civilians (p. 9 5). As Cerre describes his
dilemma, "These people had become friends of mine and protected
me through some terrible combat, and here I was now reporting on
something which I thought was probably going to end the careers of
the officers involved" (p. 96). Cerre, however, did not report facing
repercussions for his negative story.157 Branigin also reported the
shooting that he witnessed, though his account differed markedly from
the Pentagon's official version (p. 234). Still, the only response he
received from the battalion commander was "I read your story" (p.
234). Most agree that in comparison to previous conflicts, military
censorship of critical reporting was exceedingly minimal.158
Other stories were either reported more quickly due to embeds or
only made possible by their unique position. The infamous grenade
attack on his own unit by Sergeant Hasan Akbar in the lOlst Airborne
Division was broken, in part, by embedded reporter Chantal Escoto.159
"If it weren't for the embed program," stated former CNN
correspondent Robert Wiener, "I doubt the American public would
have heard about that fragging incident for a long, long time - maybe
even years."160 David Zucchino, similarly found that embedding made
new stories possible, stating, "I wrote stories I could not have
produced had I not been embedded - on the pivotal battle for
Baghdad; the performance of U.S. soldiers in combat; the crass
154. Chantal Escoto, Mission to Iraq, LEAF-CHRONICLE (Clarksville), June 22,
2003, at 11.
155. Matt Kelley, Pentagon Ponders Embedded Reporter Policy, ASSOC. PRESS, June 18,
2003, available at 2003 WL 57309513.
156. Id.
157. See p. 96.
158. See, e.g., p. 367 (Ron Martz, Military Affairs Reporter for the Atlanta Journal
Constitution, stating that "[t)here was absolutely no effort to censor anything").
159. P. 130; Chantal Escoto, Grenade Attack Surprises, Shocks Fort Campbell Troops,
LEAF-CHRONICLE (Clarksville), Mar. 24, 2003, at lA; see also Paul Friedman, TV: A Missed
Opportunity, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June 2003, at 29, 30-31 (discussing the
grenade attack and arguing that it was embedded reporters who first reported problems with
the invasion). Escoto reported facing some resistance from a commanding officer prior to
making her report. P. 130.
160. Ewers, supra note 50, at 49.
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opulence of Hussein's palaces; U.S. airstrikes on the office tower in
central Baghdad; souvenir-hunting by soldiers and reporters; and the
discovery of more than $750 million in cash in a neighborhood that
had been the preserve of top Iraqi officials."161
B. The Limits of the Program
Although embedding was, on the whole, a remarkable victory for
the press, military, and the public, it was no panacea. The program
came with its own set of inherent limitations. This Section explores
several of them, including the pressure troops exerted on embeds to
self-censor, the extreme narrowness of embed reports, embeds'
reduced objectivity, and the reduced measure of First Amendment
protection that integrating into a military unit potentially entails.
1.

Pressure to Self-Censor

Some of the reporters in Embedded faced pressure from officers to
self-censor. Washington Times photographer Joe Eddins described his
situation after taking pictures of Marines drowned after being ordered
to cross a canal in full gear without adequate safety precautions:
The morning after it came out, I was greeted by the Captain who had
printed the story out from the Internet. He held it to my face as I was
trying to shave. He said "Well, here's your story. I j ust want you to know
that a lot of the officers in the COC (Command Operations Center) are
telling me not to talk to you. To steer clear of you, not to help you out,
that kind of thing. I'll do what I can for you." (p. 69)

Eddins eventually concluded that "it became pretty evident that with a
smile on their faces, that I was being blackballed" (p. 70).
After writing a story expressing the soldiers' frustrations with the
humanitarian aspects of their mission, Brett Lieberman of the Patriot
News recalled that the commander "chewed me out" (p. 320). Later,
after publishing a story describing his unit's lack of resources,
Lieberman stated, "I found that I had an appointment at the Public
Affairs Office .... I felt like I was being called to the principal's office.
I knew it wasn't good ..." (p. 321). Lieberman believed this
unflattering story was what eventually led to his "disembedment,"
though the official reason was that he reported information on troop
movements and operational security.162

161.

P.

142 (quoting David Zucchino, The War, Up Close and Very Personal, L.A.
2003, at AS).

DMES, May 3,

162.

P.

321 ; Brett Lieberman, Covering Echo Showed Slice of War in Iraq, SUNDAY
at Dl; Story Dispute Forces Reporter to Leave Iraq, PATRIOT

PATRIOT-NEWS, May 4, 2003,
NEWS, Apr. 29, 2003, at lA.
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Al Jazeera's one embed, Amr El-Kakhy, faced substantial
opposition to his stories. El-Kakhy reported being excluded from
briefings to which Western news sources were invited (p. 182). When
he questioned the exclusion he was told, "You know, guys, you are a
station with a reputation" (p. 182). El-Kakhy eventually disembedded
after Free Iraqi Forces, who were stationed with his unit and hostile to
Al Jazeera for what they perceived as pro-Hussein coverage,
threatened his life (pp. 183-84). Typical of the military's view of Al
Jazeera was Public Affairs Officer Guy Shields, who stated, " [W]e
gave [Al Jazeera] the opportunity to be responsible journalists, they
failed miserably. . . . Their reporting was totally anti-American" (p.
78). The sentiment was echoed throughout the American ranks.163
Just as in Desert Storm, the appeals process proved worthless in
resolving such disputes. The PAG provides that disputes that cannot
be resolved at the unit level or through the chain of command are to
be referred to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs ("OASDPA") for final resolution.164 Making use of such
procedure would likely be both futile, given the time-sensitive nature
of news, and unwise antagonism of the embed's commanding officer.
Appeals to the OASDP A were potentially useful only when a
commanding officer sought to disembed a reporter for a purported
violation of the ground rules, at which point post-appeal access was
presumably better than permanent disembedment. The appellate
process was further hampered when access to higher authorities was
blocked further down the chain of command. Lieberman, for example,
later claimed that his unit refused to allow him to appeal his
disembedment.165
The enlisted men also placed subtle and not-so subtle pressure on
embeds to both abide by security limitations and produce pro-war
coverage. Dean Staley of KSTP-TV, for example, reported that after
Geraldo was disembedded for drawing troop positions in the sand on
live television, "soldiers were making j okes that they should have tied
Geraldo Rivera to a Humvee and driven him back through the desert"
(p. 139). Lieberman reported that "there was no place to escape when
[the Marines] weren't happy with everything I wrote. For example,
when I quoted commanders as referring to Marines 'acting like third
grade girls' . .. [they] were none too pleased."166

163. See p. 181 (quoting a statement of El-Kakhy that "I was told a lot of the troops
said: 'Why should we have Al Jazeera? They are the enemy. It is the potential enemy's
channel.[')").
164. P. 407 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 3.N).
165. Lieberman, supra note 162.
166. Id.
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The political leaning of the reporter and news organization to
which he belonged also affected journalists impressions of the quality
of access. Fox News Reporter Rick Levanthal recalled, "The Marines
all seemed to love Fox and they were glad that we were there. They
would speak disparagingly about other networks and they just loved
us . .. . I'd rather have them like us than dislike us . . . because we're
going to get better access" (p. 192). In contrast, some Marines referred
to CNN as the "Communist News Network" (p. 2), and anti-war El
Correo correspondent Mercedes Gallego felt compelled to keep her
feelings from the Marines she was embedded with, who she describes
as "very intolerant" (p. 88). "A liberal was like a demon [to them]"
(p. 88).
2.

Narrowly Focused Reporting

The embed system fostered a key-hole style of reporting, focusing
on the minutiae of day-to-day infantry life as opposed to broader
assessments of the war.167 The individual reporter's perspective was
"cocooned" (p. 89). It was like "squinting into a microscope," reported
Zucchino, " [o]ften I was too close or confined to comprehend the
war's broad sweep. I could not interview survivors of Iraqi civilians
killed by U.S. soldiers or speak to Iraqi fighters trying to kill
Americans. . . . I had no idea what ordinary Iraqis were
experiencing. "1 68
The myopia was exacerbated by the essentially passive nature of
embedded reporting (p. 333). Even though he may have been an
objective observer of the war, the subject of the embed's gaze was
largely determined by the military. Reporters had little ability to
investigate stories, being limited largely to what they saw, which was
dictated by where the division was ordered to go (p.90). Because they
were prohibited from bringing their own vehicles, embeds were
physically restricted by the movement of their units.169 Nor were
embeds free to "disembed," investigate, and return to their units; once
disembedded, reporters were not permitted to return.170 The inability

167. See p. 309. While the actual content of most reports was narrow, it may be, at least
in theory, possible, as Public Affairs Officer Guy Shields states, to "put together all those
600 individual pieces [and] get a pretty good overall picture." P. 75. Others have compared
this to "looking at the battlefield through 600 straws." Howard Kurtz, Capturing the War,
RECORD, May 4, 2003, at 0-1.
168. Zucchino, supra note 161.
169. See p. 403 app. (quoting PAG, supra note 14, at para. 2.C.1).
170. John Laurence, There's Geraldo, Then There Are the Rest of Us, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., May/June 2003, at 41 (describing a reporter's attempt to "re-embed");
Sherry Ricchiardi, Preparing for War, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 2003, at 29, 32 (quoting
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman: "(O]nce you (disembed], there are no guarantees that
you'll get another opportunity with that unit or necessarily even with another unit. . . . That's
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to travel independent of their unit prevented embeds from verifying
much of what they were told in briefings.171 As translator for the Los
Angeles Times Mohammed Fahmy stated about his role as a unilateral:
"We had more freedom. We got more humanitarian stories. We were
able to go to the families' houses. We were able to deal with ex
prisoners. The embedded journalists were just covering the army and
how the war was going on" (p. 242).
The narrow focus did prove ideal for providing snapshots of troop
life.172 As opposed to generals and politicians who provide military
briefings, " [s]oldiers . . . speak honestly. They just don't care about
what they say. They speak the truth, which is so refreshing" (p. 266).
The soldiers, however, largely shared the embeds' tunnel vision. Their
honesty proved useful in covering intradivision squabbles,173 but less so
in evaluating the overall conduct of the war. "Anyone in the United
States reading a newspaper or watching TV had a far better
understanding of the war [than soldiers or embeds]," explained
Zucchino.174 Some officials viewed this as a benefit of embedded
reporting; the lack of perspective prevented the embeds from
reporting a cohesive story that could help the enemy.175
3.

Diminished Objectivity

The lack of scope, tight living quarters, and depende�ce on U.S.
troops exacted an additional cost in decreased objectivity. Maintaining
an impartial stance proved difficult when embeds' lives depended

what I am talking about when I say [a reporter] 'embeds for life.' "). Pentagon Spokesman
Bryan Whitman explains:
[T)he question has to do with a hypothetical, what if my reporter goes off and does
independent reporting from his unit. First of all he won't be permitted to do that. An embed
is precisely an embed. You stay with that unit and you stay with that unit for as long as you
want to stay with that unit . . I would disabuse anybody of the idea that you can go out in
embed status and then when you get tired just do some independent coverage . . . .
. .

Department of Defense News briefing, Mar. 3, 2003, at 2003 WL 14795066 and http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/t02282003_t0227bc.html (statement of Pentagon spokesman
Bryan Whitman).
171. John Burnett, Embedded/Unembedded II, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June
2003, at 43, 43 ("The single most common criticism I heard from my embedded colleagues
during the war was the lack of mobility. . . . The inability to verify the military's version of
the war made for one-sided reporting.").
172. See, for example, pp. 329-39, discussing an interview with Rolling Stone reporter
Evan Wright, who wrote a 28,000 word chronicle about marine-grunt life.
173. See p. 266.
174. Zucchino, supra note 161.
175. See John Cook, Military, Media Meet off Battlefield to Debate War Coverage, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 18, 2003, at 1 (quoting a public affairs officer as stating that "[a) unilateral could
roam from division to division and get a better perspective than an embed on what exactly
was going to happen next, perhaps putting troops in danger if they report it.").
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upon the subjects of their reports. Embed reports suffered not from
failing to report the truth, but in solely reporting the "marine grunt
truth." Civilian deaths were told from the perspective of "scared
young men trying to protect themselves,''176 and stories of the deaths
of Iraqi soldiers from that of one whose life they had recently
threatened.177 CNN correspondent Martin Savidge put it most
eloquently when he stated:
[T)here was a constant battle between Martin Savidge, who was with the
Marines, and Martin Savidge, who was a j ournalist. It was a conflict of
the soul. The reason is because if you are in a fight as a noncombatant,
and that your life and your fate are in the hands of the unit, there will

form a bond with the soldiers. I know I did. 1 78

Zucchino described the "subtle and insidious alchemy" embedded
reporting as being a product of the near perfect alignment of reporter
and troop interests in the heat of battle.179 Zucchino was even asked to
perform a soldier's task during a firefight: scanning one of the
Bradley's vision blocks to locate targets for the vehicle's gunners.180
After the battle, Zucchino "wanted to feel compassion" for the fallen
Iraqis surrounding his Bradley, but he "could not stop thinking that
[the Iraqi's] RPG (rocket propelled grenade) could have left me dead
on the spot. "1 81
Indicati;ve of the closeness of quarters, many reporters picked up
military habits and lingo. Concerning his experience at embed boot
camp, John Koopman reported, "Richard Leiby, The Washington Post
writer, reminded people to keep their heads on a swivel (look around
for booby traps and enemy soldiers). In the barracks we talked about
getting a 'sitrep' (situation report) on whether there would be morning
'pt' (physical training)" (p. 111). Carl Nolte, also of the San Francisco
Chronicle, described how the troops he was embedded with adopted
him as their mascot (p. 168). This amiable relationship produced a
176. Gordon Dillow, Grunts and Pogues: The Embedded Life, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., May/June 2003, at 33 ("The point wasn't that I wasn't reporting the truth; the point
was that I was reporting the marine grunt truth - which had also become my truth.").
177. For example, Los Angeles Times reporter Geoffrey Mohan stated:
[N]o matter how much you guard against it. you start to identify with the people that you're
embedded with, particularly when you're being shot at. You start to look at the other side as
the enemy; you lose sympathy toward the dead enemy, or those you classify as the enemy.
There were several incidents where I really did feel that way and was shocked at how I
adopted that posture. In retrospect, I look at it as perfectly rational under the circumstances,
but it wasn't something I expected to see in myself.
Pp. 262-63.
178. P. 277; see also p. 309 ("[J]ust the fact that you're putting your life in the hands of
the Marines is . . . not conducive to objective journalism . . . ?").
179. Zucchino, supra note 161.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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divided sense of loyalty in some reporters. Nolte, for example,
contradictorily warned the troops he was embedded with, " Okay,
don't fuck up. If you fuck up, don't let me find out, because I'm gonna
report it" {p. 170).
After disembedding, some reporters maintained ties to the troops
they covered. Kevin Peraino of Newsweek described "hanging out in
my Baghdad hotel room" with soldiers from his division because
"[t]here is no doubt you like the people you cover" (p. 266). Fox News
reporter Maya Zumwalt stated, "I developed a number of friendships.
I felt like I inherited a battalion of brothers" (p. 351). "There will
probably be some journalists that become godparents to some of the
soldiers' kids," speculated Public Affairs Officer Guy Shields {p. 75).
Some reporters, accepting that objectivity under embedded
conditions would be difficult, resigned themselves to producing
inevitably biased reports. As Dillow stated, "I couldn't look anybody
in the eye and say, 'Hey, I'm being completely objective,' because I
liked and respected these guys. I called them 'my Marines.' I lived
with these guys. If I ·were to tell you, 'Oh, I was completely objective,'
wouldn't you think I was bullshitting you?" (p. 53). One UPI
correspondent stated candidly, " [r)eporters love troops. Put us with
these eighteen-year-old kids and we just turn to jelly" (p. xiii).
4.

Limited First Amendment Protection

The embed program eliminated the primary First Amendment
objections to previous regulation of war correspondents: access
restrictions and prepublication review. Unlike past programs, which
largely depended on mootness and ripeness limitations for protection
from judicial review, embedding provided reporters with the latitude
and freedom to report well within the bounds of the First
Amendment. But the embed program was not without First
Amendment implications. Although the program proved remarkably
accommodating to reporter First Amendment rights, the Iraqi
experience may prove to be an outlier in the same vein as Vietnam.
Historically, the military has conditioned grants of access on
censorship of varying degrees, and it has not disclaimed any intent to
do so in the future. Because the military has a constant need for
secrecy during war, relaxing access restrictions may produce the
unintended consequence of expanded censorship.182 Should the
military choose that course, embeds may find that courts will offer

182. For an elaboration on this argument, see Cassell, supra note 21, at 969 ("The
military often conditions access to military operations on acceptance of censorship."). Judge
Cassell has argued that access demands may, if granted, be accompanied by the unintended
consequence of a "censorship counterreaction." Id. at 972-73.
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them less protection than they would receive had they remained
unilateral.
Courts may not scrutinize embed claims as thoroughly as they
would those of a unilateral reporter. When reviewing constitutional
challenges to military regulations, the Court employs what has become
known as "the military deference doctrine," which requires a more
lenient application of the constitutional right than would be
appropriate in the civilian context.183 The military deference doctrine
diminishes the vitality of First Amendment protection to varying
degrees according to two overlapping factors: the extent to which the
speech occurs within the military community and whether the speaker
is a service member. Embedding implicates both by integrating the
reporter into the military community and blurring the distinction
between soldier and reporter.
The modem military deference doctrine dates to the Court's
decision in Parker v. Levy.184 Levy, an army captain, was court
martialed for violating two provisions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice that prohibited "conduct unbecoming an officer,'' and "all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces. "185 The conduct in question was Levy's rabble
rousing remarks to enlisted men condemning the Vietnam War.186 The
Third Circuit granted Levy's petition for habeas relief, holding that
the regulations were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.187
The Supreme Court began its analysis of Levy's claim by
announcing, " [T]he military is, by necessity, a specialized society
separate from civilian society,''188 thereby drawing a sharp distinction
between speech within the military and civilian contexts. The
military's unique need for control and obedience, and its status apart
from civilian life, justified applying a more relaxed First Amendment
analysis.189 While paying lip service to the First Amendment rights of
military personnel, the Court rejected Levy's claim, stating that the
needs of the military community "may render permissible within the
military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside
it."190 Because the First Amendment - indeed, the Constitution
183. For a history and discussion of the military deference doctrine, see generally John
F. O'Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L.
REV. 161 (2000).
184. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).

·

185. Parker, 417 U.S. at 738 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-34 (2000)).
186. Id. at 736-37.
187. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 797-99 (3d Cir. 1973).
188. Parker, 417 U.S. at 743.
189. Id. at 743-44.
190. Id. at 758.

May 2004]

The Media at the Tip of the Spear

1361

generally - operates differently within the military community, the
civilian precedents Levy relied on were not controlling.191 The Court
then declined to apply its standard overbreadth doctrine to the
challenged provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, instead
applying the more lenient vagueness standard, for which the Court
applies a strong presumption of validity.192
The Court extended the reasoning of Parker to reach the speech of
a civilian, unaffiliated with the military in Greer v. Spock.193 In Spock,
People's Party and Socialist Workers Party candidates for President
and Vice President brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of a
regulation that prohibited distribution of campaign literature and
making of political speeches in Fort Dix Military Reservation.194 Fort
Dix was open to the public, containing numerous public roads; its
entrance was unguarded and marked by a sign that said "Visitors
Welcome."195 Had the candidates sought to make their speeches and
disseminate their pamphlets on off-base public streets, similar
restrictions would have clearly violated the First Amendment, and the
Court so acknowledged.196 But because the speech occurred on a
military base, which was presumptively not a public forum, the
regulations were upheld.197 The Court found it sufficient that the
military had not "abandoned any claim of special interest in regulating
the distribution of unauthorized leaflets or the delivery of campaign
speeches for political candidates within the confines of the military
reservation."198 Spock marked a substantial expansion of the doctrine
of military deference. Whereas Parker v. Levy involved censorship of
a serviceman's speech pursuant to the congressionally enacted
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Spock was a civilian whose speech
was silenced pursuant to a purely executive regulation.199
The Court confirmed that precedents establishing the military
deference doctrine applied to both civilians and servicemen in Brown
v. Glines,200 a case involving a regulation that prohibited Air Force
191. See id. at 756 (holding that vagueness challenges to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice are to be judged by the standard that applies to criminal statutes regulating economic
activity).
192. Id. at 756-57.
193. 424 U.S. 828, 837 (1976).
194. Spock, 424 U.S. at 832-34.
195. Id. at 830. The Court of Appeals held that the government could not allow access
to some members of the public and deny it to others based solely on the political content of
their speech. Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1056 (1972).
196. See Spock, 424 U.S. at 835-36 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)).
197. Id. at 840.
198. Id. at 837.
199. O'Connor, supra note 183, at 247-48.
200. 444 U.S. 348, 361 (1980).
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members from collecting signatures for a petition without first
obtaining the permission of their commander. Captain Glines had
been removed from active duty after circulating a petition, ultimately
intended for Congress, concerning the Air Force's grooming
standards.201 In upholding the prior restraint, the Court relied heavily
on Spock, even though Glines was a member of the armed forces
while the speakers in Spock were not.202 In so doing, the Court
emphasized that the strength with which the military deference
doctrine operated was determined by both the identity of the speaker
and the context of the speech.203 Regardless of the identity of the
speaker, First Amendment rights are weaker when exercised within a
military context because most property under military control is not a
public forum.204 That the speaker is a serviceman and therefore a
member of "the military community" merely grants the military even
greater leeway to restrict speech.205
Although the Court's application of the military deference
doctrine to the First Amendment has been limited to speech on bases,
there are reasons to think it would similarly apply to a military unit
engaged in combat.206 The purpose of the military-civilian community
distinction, the Court has stated, is to allow the military to "maintain
the discipline essential to perform its mission effectively."207 It would
make little sense to allow speech restrictions on the grounds that they

201. Brown, 444 U.S. at 351.
202 See Spock, 424 U.S. at 832 (describing speakers as candidates for president).
203. See Brown, 444 U.S. at 356 n.13 ("[T]he military has greater authority over
servicemen than a civilian."); id. at 357 n.14 (emphasizing that the Court's decision applies to
a variety of military installations).
204. Id. at 358 n.13 ("Glines would distinguish Spock on the ground that the plaintiffs in
that case were civilians who had no specific right to enter a military base. The distinction is
unpersuasive."); see also Ethredge v. Hail, 56 F.3d 1324, 1327-29 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying a
lenient form of review to a military base's ban on bumper stickers that "embarrass[] or
disparage" the President when enforced against a civilian contractor); Jonathan Turley, The
Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 73 (2002) ("On a military base, commanders
have been allowed to restrict speech of servicemembers and civilians alike, though the
degree of such restrictions is far greater for the former than the latter.").
205. Brown, 444 U.S. at 356 n.13 ("Unauthorized distributions of literature by military
personnel are just as likely to undermine discipline and morale as similar distributions by
civilians. Furthermore, the military has greater authority over a serviceman than over a
civilian.").
206. Note also that the First Amendment would not apply at all to a foreign reporter
embedded overseas. See United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904)
(holding that an alien attempting to enter the United States is not protected by First
Amendment); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that Fourth
Amendment does not apply to overseas alien without voluntary attachment).
207. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974); see also Brown, 444 U.S. at 356 (stating
that because a commander "is charged with maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he
must have authority over [speech] that could affect adversely these essential attributes of an
effective military force").
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are necessary to ensure combat readiness, and then to allow that same
speech during actual combat. If anything, the need for discipline is
heightened during combat, and similarly so should the vigor with
which the military deference doctrine is applied.
The military deference doctrine may prove problematic on two
grounds should future embeds bring First Amendment claims. First,
courts may permit more substantial restrictions on embed speech
because a military unit, like a military base, is not a public forum. Both
units and bases are ordinarily closed to the public, and the military still
has not abandoned its interest in regulating speech in either
environment.208
Although embedding opened the military unit to some speech
activities, embedding did not transform the military unit into a
designated public forum. By opening public property to indiscriminate
use as a place for expressive activity, the government can become
bound by the same stringent First Amendment standards as are
applicable in a traditional public forum.209 But a designated public
forum is not created when access is limited to select speakers, as
opposed to general access for a class of speakers.210 When members of
that class of designated speakers must still obtain permission to gain
access, no designated public forum has been created.211 Although
embedding was a widespread practice, military units were not thrown
indiscriminately open to any reporter who should wish to embed.
Instead, the Pentagon retained discretion in allocating slots, basing its
decision largely on the news outlet's nationality and circulation, no
doubt excluding many willing journalists.212 Similarly, the Pentagon
continued to impose some content limitations on embed speech
relating to American casualties and troop movements, thereby

208. See Spock v. Greer, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976) (holding that because the military
had not abandoned any claim of interest in regulating speech on a military base, the base
was not a public forum); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) ("Military bases
generally are not public fora . . . . ").
209. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 8:7
(1996) (describing the designated public forum as "opened by the state for indiscriminate
use as a place for expressive activity").
210. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679-80 (1998).
211. Id. at 679.
212. See Howard Kurtz, Little media flak about Pentagon, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Mar. 12, 2003, at 12A (stating that The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall
Street Journal each received a dozen slots; ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN, Fox, and the Associated
Press each received twenty-six slots; and foreign news sources were allocated only twenty
percent of the slots); Interview by BBC TV with Brian Whitman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (Apr. 18, 2003), at http://www.
defenselink.rnil/transcripts/2003/tr2003041 8-0142.html (describing the allocation of embed
slots as complex and subjective).
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retaining its interest in regulating embed speech and exhibiting an
intent to not transform the unit into a public forum.213
An embedded reporter, therefore, likely would enjoy the same
First Amendment protection as that enjoyed by the leafleteers and
speakers in Greer v. Spock. Content-based regulations in nonfora, like
military units and bases, are governed by a reasonableness standard.214
Entire classes of speech can be excluded, so long as such efforts are
not intended to suppress expression based on the speaker's
viewpoint. 215
Even these meager limits on the military's power to suppress
speech in a nonpublic forum might not be strenuously enforced by the
courts. The Eleventh Circuit has, for example, applied the viewpoint
neutrality requirement in a less-than-rigorous manner to the speech of
a civilian contractor on a military base in Ethredge v. Hail.216 Ethredge,
a civilian aircraft mechanic on Robins Air Force Base, was ordered to
remove bumper stickers critical of the President from the car he used
on base, pursuant to an administrative order barring " 'bumper
stickers . . . that embarrass or disparage' the President."217 The court
first concluded that Ethredge's speech occurred in a nonpublic forum,
and could therefore be subject to reasonable, viewpoint-neutral
regulation.218 The court then remarkably concluded that banning only
speech that embarrasses the President was viewpoint neutral. The
court reasoned that it was conceivable that a message supportive of
the President might still embarrass him.219 This conclusion is dubious,
and the court's reasoning is disingenuous.220 By prohibiting speech that
embarrasses the President, but not speech pleasing to him, the order
handicaps one side of the political debate much more severely than

213. But see Nation Magazine v. United States Dep't of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1573
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the Desert Storm press pool was a limited public forum
despite access limitations). This holding has subsequently been undermined by Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, where the Court stated that "[a] designated
forum is not created when the government allows selective access for individual speakers
rather than general access for a class of speakers." Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679.
214. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
215. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
216. 56 F.3d 1324 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
217. Ethredge, 56 F.3d at 1325.
218. Id. at 1327.
219. Id.
220. Captain John A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance
Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 342 (1998) ("[D]espite
the court's conclusion to the contrary, the order is undoubtedly both content and viewpoint
based."); Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 146-47
( 1996) ("In Ethredege the court turned intellectual somersaults to avoid finding viewpoint
discrimination . . . . ); Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 ,
7 3 n.322 (2002) (describing the court's conclusion a s "highly dubious").
"
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the other.221 Ethredge, therefore, suggests that even the lessened
protection that embeds would be entitled to as speakers in a non-fora
might be circumscribed by the military deference doctrine.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom the Pentagon did, however,
indiscriminately open the battlefield to all unilaterals for use as a place
of expressive activity, thereby arguably producing a designated public
forum.222 By opening Iraq's borders, the military intended to make the
battlefield "generally available."223 Because access to the battlefield
and Iraq generally ceased to be "selective," unilaterals operated inside
a designated public forum.224 The same highly protective legal
standards apply to the regulation of speech in a designated public
forum as in a traditional public forum.225 In particular, content-based
restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.226 Forum analysis therefore
suggests that unilaterals enjoyed a higher degree of protection than
embeds, who because they were closely tied to their units,227 were not
able to enjoy the benefits of the designated public forum.
The second potential limitation on the First Amendment rights of
embeds is that, due to their extensive integration into the functioning
of the units they covered, a court may hold that their speech can be
more completely regulated due to their similarity to a service member
or military employees. Embeds were more than temporary visitors on
a military base, they were long-term members of a military unit. In
some instances, they even assisted their units in important military
tasks such as acting as a spotter for marine gunners228 or, in the case of
one reporter who also happened to be a doctor, performing surgery on
fallen soldiers (pp. 36-37). When an embed occupies a position in a
military unit that but for his presence would be taken by another

221. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) ("[The government] has no
such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to
follow Marquis of Queensberry rules."); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317
(1990) (holding that prohibitions of actions that "deface" and "defile" the flag are not
viewpoint neutral); Heins, supra note 220, at 146. It is worth noting that courts have not
limited forum analysis to areas strictly within the territory of the United States. See Nation
Magazine v. United States Dep't. of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1573 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying
forum analysis to overseas press pools).
222. See, e.g., Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir.
1996) (opening of a senior center to the public for speech purposes created a designated
public forum).
223. See generally Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678-79 (1998) (discussing the requirement that, to
create a designated public forum, the government intend to make it generally available).
224. See id. at 679-80 (discussing the selective versus general access distinction).
225. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 209, at § 8:9.
226. 1 id.
227. See supra notes 169-172, and accompanying text (discussing mobility limitations on
embeds, who were not permitted to leave their units).
228. Zucchino, supra note 161, at AS.
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soldier, and that embed performs functions vital to the unit's
operation, the military's interest in applying a uniform body of
military law and regulation is implicated.229 A court may therefore
apply the doctrine of military deference as developed in cases
involving the speech of servicemen and military employees to embeds'
speech.
This blurriness between civilians, military employees, and
servicemen, is also reflected in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in
Ethredge v. Hail.230 After applying a less-than-rigorous viewpoint
neutrality analysis, the court addressed the reasonableness and
possible overbreadth of the order,231 relying on precedent originally
applied to servicemen. In finding the order reasonable, the court first
quoted Goldman v. Weinberger,232 a case pertaining to a serviceman's
First Amendment rights, for the proposition that " [t]he military need
not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such
tolerance is required of the civilian state . . . ."233 The court then noted
that under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") the
military can punish " [a]ny commissioned officer who uses
contemptuous words against the President,"234 while ignoring that this
provision, by its terms, does not apply to civilians. The court
ultimately found the order reasonable because deference was due to
the military's professional judgment, again relying on Goldman.235
Finally, in addressing Ethredge's overbreadth challenge, the court
unhesitantly applied Parker v. Levy's more lenient vagueness
standard, rather than the more stringent civilian standard.236 The
Ethredge court's willingness to rely on Supreme Court precedent that
had previously only been applied to the speech of servicemen suggests
that, for First Amendment purposes, the line between reporter and
soldier may be blurrier than the media would like.

229. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(b) (applying uniform code of military justice to persons
accompanying armed forces during war); cf Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974) ("Just
as military society has been a society apart from civilian society, so ' [m]ilitary Jaw . . . is a
jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the Jaw which governs in our federal
judicial establishment.' ") (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)).
230. Ethredge, 56 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1995).
231. Id. at 1328-29.
232. Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
233. Ethredge, 56 F.3d at 1328.
234. Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2000)).
235. Id. at 1328-29.
236. Id. at 1329 (relying on Parker, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)).
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C. Unilaterals
Although the Pentagon's position towards unilaterals was
begrudging acceptance,237 many military officials were critical of the
decision to allow unilateral reporters into Iraq,238 and some non
embedded journalists practice were treated with hostility reminiscent
of Desert Storm. In response to the shelling of the Palestine Hotel in
Baghdad that killed three unilateral journalists, Public Affairs Officer
Guy Shields stated, "Well, maybe the journalists who were staying in
the Palestine decided to embed on the wrong side" (p. 7 5). One
Marine commander described unilaterals as "leeches. "239 Susan
Glassner of the Washington Post commented, "The idea of an
independent journalist covering the conflict was anathema to the
military. I think Public Affairs Officer, Colonel Shields, was never able
to work it out, though there was general goodwill on his part. . .. They
wanted to channel everything to its own embed program, which was
controlled" (p. 292).
Unilaterals often reported suffering from coalition-created
difficulties.240 In contrast to the embeds' easy entry into Iraq, many
unilaterals snuck across the border early in violation of military
rules.241 One technique was for reporters to disguise themselves as aid
workers, who were permitted to cross the border.242 When, during the
riots in Basra, she sought refuge in a government palace held by the
British, Glasser reported that "they wouldn't let us in there because
we were unilateral journalists and not embedded. . . . [T]here was a
standing order not to admit any unilateral journalists" (p. 29 5). In one
incident, two Israeli and two Portuguese unilaterals were detained for
forty-eight hours by U.S. forces in Iraq and accused of being spies.243
While it is tempting to view the throwing open of individual
military units as the pinnacle of First Amendment freedom, the press
was often the most informative and objective when it operated
independent of Marines or Public Affairs Officers. Embedded
reporting, while providing a valuable supplement to independent

237. See John Donvan, For the Unilaterals, No Neutral Ground, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., May/June 2003, at 35; Jennifer LaFleur, Embed Program Worked, Broader War
Coverage Lagged, NEWS MEDIA & L., May 1, 2003, at 46.
238. Cook, supra note 175, at 231.
239. Id.
240. See Mark Jurkowitz, Media protest treatment in Iraq: Letter to Pentagon accuses US
troops of intimidation, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2003, at A25, available at 2003 WL
66477237.
241. See p. 292; Donvan, supra note 237, at 36.
242. Donvan, supra note 237, at 36.
243. P. xvi; Sherry Ricchiardi, Close to the Action, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May 2003, at
28, 32.
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coverage, would not have alone provided means to fully assess the
conduct of the War. This Section argues that by providing breadth of
vision while maintaining greater objectivity, unilaterals remedied
many of the limitations inherent in embedded reporting.
1.

Unilaterals as a Supplement to Embeds

Despite Pentagon- and Iraqi-imposed difficulties, unilateral
reporting proved essential to providing a full, balanced picture of the
War in two respects. First, unilaterals had access to information that
embeds lacked. Unilaterals were able to observe the effects of the
fighting in parts of Iraq geographically isolated from U.S. troops, and
to interact with Iraqi officials and civilians. For example, unilateral
Anna Badkhen of the San Francisco Chronicle worked closely with
peshmerga fighters to report on the war's impact on the Kurdish
resistance.244 Other unilaterals provided coverage of the aftermath of
the Iraqi government's collapse, the fates of deserters from the Iraqi
army, and the impact of the war on Iraqi civilians.245 Unilaterals were
also able to provide follow-up coverage long after an embed's unit had
moved on. John Donvan of ABC News, for example, reported that the
warm welcome embeds and U.S. troops received from Iraqi civilians
often deteriorated after the tanks and guns were out of sight.246 Most
significantly, unilaterals were able "to report on what was going on
beyond the narrow aperture of [a] particular unit" (p. 37 5).
Second, because their interests were not so closely aligned with
those of U.S. troops, unilaterals were more easily able to maintain the
objectivity necessary to adequately inform the public of the conduct of
the war.247 Unilateral reporting not only guaranteed that the press had
access to much of the information necessary to inform the public, but

244. See pp. 17-18; Anna Badkhen, Iraqi Kurds Hope Against Hope: Peshmarga fighters
look to U.S. for their long-awaited liberation, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 31, 2003, at Wl, available at
http://www .sfgate.com/cgi-bin/artcle.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/31/MN78738.DTL;
Anna Badkhen, Living and Farming in the Shadow of Iraqi Guns: Kurdish enclave of Kalak
faces new risks with invasion of Iraq, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 24, 2003, at W5, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/artcle.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/24/MN266619.DTL;
Anna Badkhen, Turkish-Kurd conflict feared - WAITING: Ethnic minority relying on U.S.
invasion, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 21, 2003, at W12, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin
/artcle.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2003/03/21/MN223039.DTL.
245. See, e.g. , p. 124 (unilateral freelance photographer Robert J. Galbraith describing
post-war looting within Baghdad); pp. 296-97 (unilateral Susan Glasser of the Washington
Post describing her encounters with recently freed Iraqi political prisoners); Anna Badkhen,
Iraqi Soldier's Life - or Death - mystery at bombed base, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2003, at
A16, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/artcle.cgi?file=/chronicle=/archive/2003/04/
07/MN270266.DTL; Anthony Shadid, Baghdad: Minding Your Minder, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., May/June 2003, at 36.
246. Donvan, supra note 237, at 35.
247. See supra note 171.
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it ensured that reporters were willing to report critically and
objectively. These presumptively objective reports allowed editors to
balance unilateral against embed stories, thereby providing the
perspective necessary to make informed editorial decisions and
evaluate competing claims.248
2.

Unilaterals in the Marketplace of Ideas

Although objectivity and mobility made unilaterals an invaluable
supplement to the embed program, there is no guarantee that the next
war will provide unilaterals with the same degree of access they
enjoyed in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition to the quantity of
information that a limited-access policy would deprive the public of, a
policy of embed-only war reporting threatens to remove a vitally
important voice from the marketplace of ideas on military policy.
What truly distinguished the embed program from previous efforts
to shape war coverage is that the embed program forsook official
coercion as a means. Favorable reports were garnered, not by
previewing stories or limiting reporters' access to the more gruesome
aspects of the fighting, but by a particularly subtle form of
persuasion.249 As opposed to previous wars, where reporters were kept
distinctly apart from the troops, embeds became a part of and
identified with the American military effort, inevitably producing a
more sympathetic portrayal.
This conclusion is troubling because it suggests that the Pentagon
was advancing a particular viewpoint on Operation Iraqi Freedom, not
through directly advocating that position to the American people, but
by creating the embed program as a means of placing subtle
situational pressures on private speakers that would produce a more
favorable style of war coverage.250 Although the Pentagon was not
speaking per se, it nevertheless adopted the embed program with the
hope that it would impact the content of public discourse.251 The

248. See Geert Linnebank, Counteract Drawbacks of 'Embedded' Reporters, USA
Mar. 31, 2003, at 15A ("[The news executive] has to ensure that he deploys some
roving reporters . . . to try to balance, if not verify, what the 'embeds' are saying . . . . Finally,
the news executive needs a vigilant - and skeptical - editing desk . . . . ).
TODAY,

"

249. See Burnett, supra note 171, at 43 ("Much of the Marine command that I met saw
us, not as neutral journalists who had a job to do, but as instruments to reflect the
accomplishments and glory of the United States Marine Corps.").
250. Cf MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 145 (1983) ("Government has
the potential to engineer public consent by dominating communications networks and
selectively disclosing or revealing information.").
251. Tim Burt, Embedded Reporters Gave "More Balanced War Coverage, " FIN.
TlMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at 13 (describing a BBC study that concluded that the embed program
was "designed to keep public opinion on the side of the U.S. forces"), available at 2003 WL
66615841.
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embed program can, therefore, be analogized to a form of government
speech.
Government speech and its impact on public discourse has been a
topic of lively debate in recent years;252 a few observations will suffice
for our purposes. Government efforts to shape the content of political
discourse and the flow of information is most troubling when the
government is either the only voice in the relevant speech market or a
pervasive force in shaping the functioning of that market.253 A
competitive marketplace of ideas, with multiple sources of information
and competing voices, ensures a fractured source of political truths. A
government that obtains a monopoly as either the sole source of
information concerning its own actions or as the lone norm
articulating voice can skew the ideas that reach an interested audience
and threaten an entrenchment of political power.254 This concern is
compounded when the government influence on the marketplace of
ideas is non-obvious.255 Knowledge of the government's role in shaping
speech enables the listener to assess its value, exposes potential biases,
and facilitates the pursuit of competing speakers and viewpoints.256
Because the government has the power to restrict all access to the
battlefield, it also may, by restricting the access of unilateral reporters,
grant it solely to embeds. Substantial restriction of unilateral access
would distort the marketplace of ideas in two manners. First, an
embed-only style of coverage would lack the unique voices and
perspectives offered by unilateral reporters. Elimination of these
reports and ideas would not be because they were unfit to compete

252. See generally id. ; Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of
Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1491-95 (2001) ; Abner S. Greene, Government
Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001); Frederick Schauer, Is
Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 379 (1983) (reviewing YUDOF, supra
note 250); William W. Van Alstyne, The First A mendment and the Suppression of
Warmongering Propaganda in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 J. L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 530 (1966).
253. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 252, at 1488 (discussing the danger of government
participation in the marketplace of ideas that drowns out rival communications); David
Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government
Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 680-81 (1992) (discussing the danger of the
"indoctrinating effect of a monopolized marketplace of ideas"); Abner S. Greene,
Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 27-40 (2000) [hereinafter Greene,
Government of the Good] (discussing the effects of government monopolization of the
marketplace of ideas); Schauer, supra note 252, at 379-80 (arguing that government speech is
less of a problem when the government is one of many speakers).
254. See YUDOF, supra note 250, at 170 ("The greater the state's monopoly, the more
apparent the dangers of government communications."); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 252,
at 1491.
255. See Greene, Government of the Good, supra note 253, at 50 (discussing the
importance of transparent identification of the speaker as a means of warding off
monopolization of the marketplace of ideas).
256. See id.
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with embed reports in the marketplace of ideas, but because they
faced the barrier to entry imposed by the Pentagon's access
restrictions. While government-sponsored speech is often criticized for
its ability to "drown out" other speakers,257 exclusion of unilaterals
from the battlefield would go one step further by eliminating their
voices entirely.258
Second, an embed-only style of reporting would decrease the
saliency of the limitations of that style of reporting. Unilaterals did
more than add an additional, competing viewpoint to the marketplace
of ideas; they clarified the value of embed speech and thereby
heightened the exercise of our collective judgment.259 Comparison of
unilateral to embed reports made transparent both the military's
influence on those reports and their gaps and narrowness. By making
the government's influence on embed reports more apparent,
unilateral reports both encouraged the pursuit of and provided a
source of competing voices.260 The availability of both unilateral and
embed reports revealed the deficiencies and biases of each group of
reporters. The unilateral coverage of the Iraqi military and civilians
and the diverse perspectives those reports offered made the embeds'
situational constraints apparent.261
CONCLUSION

The same qualities that made the Pentagon's Operation Iraqi
Freedom media policies a success also make Emedded a dynamic and
diverse read. Access to U.S. troops and the battlefield allowed the
journalists of Embedded to produce the extensive frontline coverage
that was missing from Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm. Unlike
those operations, during which the story of the American soldier went

257. E.g., YUDOF, supra note 250, at 155 ("There is the danger that a well-heeled
government might so dominate the opportunities for mass communications (which are not
infinite) that individual voices would be drowned out."); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1 104 (1979); Van
Alstyne, supra note 252, at 533.
258. Cf Schauer, supra note 252, at 379-81 (criticizing the "drowns out" metaphor
because government speech does not eliminate private speech entirely).
259. Cf YUDOF, supra note 250, at 156 ("The 'thinking process of the community' may
be mutilated as much by government expression and nondisclosure as by government
censorship.").
260. See Greene, Government of the Good, supra note 253, at 50 ("[T]he transparent
identification of speech as the government's helps to ward off monopolization. By knowing
the source of speech, one can more readily assess its value and search for competing
speakers and viewpoints.").
261. See YUDOF, supra note 250, at 169 ("[I]t appears likely that government may be
more persuasive . . . when alternative voices are muffled."); Bezanson & Buss, supra note
252, at 1491-92 (arguing that government speech is less objectionable when there is wide
opportunity for non-government voices to reach listeners).
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largely untold. and the actions of the military largely unobserved,
Operation Iraqi Freedom featured an unsurpassed volume of original,
up close war reporting.
Embedded also reveals, however, the inherent limitations of that
style of reporting. As the journalist in Embedded admit, reporting
from within a military unit resulted in overly focused coverage, a
diminished sense of objectivity, and the pressure to self-censor.
Embeds were unable to cover events that they couldn't observe
through a gun aperture, and their reports suffered from the actual
and perceived pressure to self-censor unflattering portrayals of their
new hosts.
Embeds, by gaining greater access to the front lines, may also have
sacrificed a degree of First Amendment protection. In addition to the
waivers that embeds were forced to sign, embeds may have subjected
their First Amendment claims to application to a less protective set of
precedents. The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to scrutinize
First Amendment claims as closely when the relevant speech occurs in
a military environment or the speaker is closely affiliated with the
armed forces. Embedding may invite application of this less protective
line of cases.
Unilaterals proved a necessary remedy to these limitations and an
invaluable component to the success of both Embedded, the book, and
embedding, the policy. Because their movement was not limited to
that of the unit they covered, unilaterals were able to report on events
far removed from actual combat. Their presence also guaranteed a
competing, non-government-influenced set of perspectives on the
conduct of the War.
Although far from perfect, the success of the Pentagon's new
policies refutes the conventional wisdom gleaned from Vietnam,
Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm, that a war must be conducted in
complete secrecy to be successful. The Operation Iraqi Freedom
experience, as illustrated by Embedded, could serve as a rough
blueprint for maximizing press freedom without sacrificing security in
future conflicts.

